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LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is currently a debate within the legal community 
over whether certain civil suits may be too complex to be 
tried to a jury. In fact, the United States Supreme Court 
was recently requested to decide if the seventh amendment 
right to a trial by jury could be waived in a civil suit 
because the complexity of the issues would severely diminish 
the jury's ability to render a well reasoned verdict (APA 
Monitor, 1986). 
At the heart of the debate over a "complexity 
exception" to the seventh amendment is the question of 
whether juries are capable of competently deciding complex 
an~/or protracted civil suits. Attorneys in favor of 
waving an individual's right to a jury trial argue that the 
nature of certain civil suits-- their length, highly 
technical and abstract subject matter, and amount of 
evidence presented-- preclude jurors from engaging in 
diligent information processing. Therefore, they contend 
that their own clients' fifth amendment right to due 
process would be denied if the seventh amendment right to a 
jury trial were to take precedence (Blecher & Daniels,1980; 
1 
Withrow & Suggs,1980). 
Advocates 
seventh amendment 
comprehend the 
favoring a complexity 
make two assumptions: 
facts and issues 
2 
exception to the 
(1) jurors cannot 
in complex civil 
litigation, and therefore, reach a reasoned decision, and 
(2) a judge sitting alone is a better fact-finder than a 
collective jury. In terms of the latter assumption, Saks 
(1981), in a published report to the Federal Judicial 
Center, concluded, after reviewing the literature 
concerning small group decision making and complex 
information tasks, that the fact-finding task of a jury is 
of the type in which large heterogeneous groups should 
perform better than individuals. 1 
In addition to its intuitive appeal, however, the 
former assumption that, jurors in a complex lawsuit cannot 
reach a sound decision, has received some empirical 
support. Although studies which have examined the effect 
of task complexity on information processing and decision 
making are few, overall, the findings indicate that a 
complex task gives rise to a less effortful mode of 
information processing (Bodenhausen & Lictenstein, 1987; 
Hogarth, 1980; Payne, 1976). Furthermore, these studies 
imply that complex tasks result in decisions that 
individuals would not have made if they had been processing 
information more thoroughly. 
According to Hogarth (1980), task complexity is one of 
four factors that 
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engenders less formal information 
processing strategies or the use of potentially erroneous 
simplifying rules or heuristics. In the most applicable 
study conducted to date, Payne (1976) found that as task 
complexity increased, a decision maker's method of 
processing information changed from a consistent and 
thorough evaluation of the information presented to an 
inconsistent and more effortless evaluation of the 
information. In Payne's study, complexity was defined as 
more information. 
More recently, Bodenhausen and Lichtenstein (1987) 
found that a more complex decision task resulted in the use 
of a simplifying rule which was of little diagnostic value--
a stereotype. In Bodenhausen and Lichtenstein's study, the 
complex decision task was judging the guilt of a Hispanic 
defendant and an ethnically nondescript defendant while the 
less complex decision task was judging the aggressiveness of 
the same two types of defendants as in the complex task. 
Although all subjects performed both types of decision 
tasks, at the onset of the experiment, one half of the 
subjects were led to believe that their task was to judge 
the guilt of the two defendants while the remaining one half 
believed that their task was to rate the aggressiveness of 
the two defendants. The results showed that individuals who 
performed the more complex task, judged the defendant as 
more guilty and aggressive when he was Hispanic than when 
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he was ethnically nondescript. Conversely, individuals who 
performed the simple task, did not perceive one defendant as 
more or less guilty or aggressive than the other. Thus, the 
complexity of the task affected not only the amount of 
effort individuals put forth in reaching a decision, but 
also resulted in a decision that the decision makers might 
not have made if presented with a more simple task. Of even 
greater importance, however, is the finding that the mere 
thought of engaging in a complex task caused individuals to 
employ a less formal information processing strategy. 
Although these findings do not favor the view that 
jury trials in complex cases should be preserved, what are 
the implications of such findings for real jury trials? In 
a real trial, where the jury's decision is binding, and the 
consequence of the decision 
use a less thorough mode 
reaching a decision? 
is real, would jurors actually 
of information processing for 
Studies from the information 
making literature suggest that processing and decision 
jurors would not. 
meaningful (Langer, 
When the consequences of a decision are 
Blank & Chanowitz 1978), the issues 
under consideration are important or relevant to the 
decision maker (Gabrenya & Arkin, 1979; Sherman & Corty, 
1984), or if the decision maker will be held accountable for 
his/her decision (Tetlock, 1983), the decision maker will 
adopt a more careful and thorough information processing 
strategy. 
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In general, the literature supports Taylor's (1980) 
characterization of humans as cognitive misers who engage in 
irrational, top of the head (Taylor & Fiske, 1978) or 
mindless (Langer, Blank & Chanowitz, 1978) information 
processing unless motivated, usually by the desire to be 
correct, to process information more thoroughly. In a real 
trial, therefore, when jurors' desires to reach a correct 
decision are high, the complexity of the task should not 
have any effect on the manner in which jurors process 
information. 
Still, other studies suggest that high motivation, 
although necessary for effortful information processing, is 
not a sufficient condition for such processing. According 
to Hogarth (1980), the presence of any one of four 
conditions-- task complexity, procedural uncertainty, low 
motivation, and emotional stress-- will result in the use of 
less formal information processing strategies. Studies from 
the persuasion literature concur with Hogarth's assertions. 
And, unlike the information processing and decision making 
research, which has produced a listing of factors that 
engender less effortful information processing, research 
conducted within the persuasion field has lead to the 
development of several theories specifying both the 
antecedents to either more effortful or effortless 
information processing as well as the processes thought to 
underlie the two modes (Chaiken, 1987; Petty & Cacioppo, 
6 
1986). 
Persuasion Research 
One of the first persuasion theories on the 
informational message is Petty and 
1986) Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM). 
processing of an 
Cacioppo's (1981, 
According to the ELM, individuals process an informational 
message, such as a legal argument or commercial, with 
varying degrees of cognitive effort, with the extreme poles 
of the continuum anchored by a central processing strategy 
and peripheral processing strategy. The central route is 
characterized by a diligent consideration of the information 
presented while the peripheral approach relies on the use of 
"simple rules of thumb" or heuristic principles. Through 
the central route, individuals reach a decision or are 
persuaded based on careful analysis of the content of the 
message. Under the peripheral route, however, individuals 
reach a decision or are persuaded based on cues irrelevant 
to the Quality of the message. For example, in a legal 
case, a juror may reach a decision based not on the cogency 
of the arguments but on characteristics of the defendant and 
stereotypes associated with these characteristics (e.g., 
the defendant is an Indian doctor, and thus, more likely to 
commit medical malpractice). 
One of the key features of the ELM is the postulate 
specifying the conditions necessary for inducing one 
processing mode as opposed to the other. According to the 
7 
theory, an individual's use of the peripheral rather than 
the central route is a function of two factors, both the 
individual's motivation and ability to process the 
informational message. Essentially, any variable which 
reduces a person's motivation and/or ability to think about 
(or elaborate on) the message content will make the 
peripheral route more likely" (Petty, Cacioppo, &·Goldman, 
1981, p. 854). 
Petty and Cacioppo's research has led to the 
identification of a variety of conditions that either 
enhance or reduce an individual's motivation or ability to 
scrutinize an informational message (Cacioppo & Petty, 
1979; Petty & Cacioppo, 1979; Petty & Cacioppo, 1984; Petty 
& Cacioppo, 1986; Petty, Wells & Brock, 1976). Subsequent 
research has demonstrated that once an individual's 
motivation and/or ability to process an argument has been 
decreased, peripheral cues become more important 
determinants of message acceptance (Petty, Cacioppo & 
Goldman, 1981; Petty, Cacioppo & Schumann, 1984). In the 
first of several studies systematically examining the effect 
of various factors on an individual's motivation to process 
an informational message, Petty, Cacioppo and Goldman, 
(1981) found that when a message was high in personal 
relevance (college students were told that within the next 
year, all graduating seniors would be required to take 
comprehensive exams), the content of the message (weak 
8 
versus strong argument) mediated attitude change. However, 
when the message was 
exams would not go 
low in personal relevance (mandatory 
into effect until ten years later), 
peripheral cues, such as the expertise of the message source 
(a neighboring high school student versus a Princeton 
University Professor), mediated attitude change. In 
accounting for the observed effect, the authors reasoned 
that as the personal importance of a message increased, it 
became more important for the message recipient to hold a 
correct opinion. The authors concluded that issues of high 
personal relevance motivated the message recipient to 
scrutinize the arguments in an effort to judge their 
veridicality. In contrast, when an issue was of little 
personal relevance, the recipient may have been more 
motivated to reduce cognitive effort than to form a correct 
opinion. 
A conceptual replication of this study (Petty, 
Cacioppo, Schumann, 1983), as well as studies conducted by 
other persuasion researchers (Chaiken, 1980) and 
researchers from outside the persuasion field (Gabrenya & 
Arkin, 1979), supported this initial supposition. Chaiken 
(1980) found that when university students were presented 
with a message advocating that the university switch from a 
semester to a trimester system wit~in the next year (high 
personal relevance), students' attitudes changed in the 
direction of the message containing five as opposed to one 
9 
strong argument. But, for students who heard the message 
that the university should adopt a trimester system sometime 
in the distant future--after they graduated (low personal 
relevance), their attitudes changed in the direction of the 
more likable source even though this was the source who 
presented only one argument. 
In a conceptually distinct experiment, Gabrenya and 
Arkin (1979) also tested the hypothesis that the 
motivational state of an individual, rather than his/her 
inherent processing limitations, governed the use of 
heuristic principles. In Gabrenya and Arkin's (1979) study 
motivation was manipulated by asking both field dependent 
and independent subjects to solve a decision problem which 
typically instigated heuristic decision processes (Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1973) in a situation where their performance 
outcomes were either made public or kept private. 
Consistent with Petty and Cacioppo's theory, subjects use of 
the representative heuristic was a function of their 
motivational state. The results revealed that field 
independent subjects in the private condition demonstrated 
greater use of the representative heuristic (poorer 
performance) than did field dependent subjects in the public 
condition, and field dependents showed the opposed 
performance pattern. In the public condition, both field 
independents and dependents can be viewed as residing on the 
right side of an inverted ''U" shaped performance curve. 
10 
But, because of greater evaluation apprehension, field 
dependent subjects become aroused past the point of optimal 
performance whereas field independent subjects become 
motivated to perform better. In the private condition, the 
inverse occured. Field dependent subjects were optimally 
motivated in the private condition whereas field 
independents' motivational level fell below that necessary 
for optimal performance. 
Although Petty and Cacioppo's (1986) examination of 
factors that enhance or reduce an individual's ability to 
process an argument has been less exhaustive than their 
work with motivation, in general, the research supports the 
I 
assumption that decreased ability to process an argument 
centrally enhances the use of peripheral cues. In an 
indirect test of the use of peripheral cues under low 
ability conditions, university students were presented with 
a variety of messages advocating certain university wide 
policy changes (e.g., dormitory bed checks). One half of 
the subjects did this while copying lists of two-digit 
numbers (distraction condition). In addition, within each 
condition, the ·message was delivered either by a credible or 
less credible source (Kiesler & Mathog, 1968). As 
expected, the distracted subjects were more likely to agree 
with the highly credible source than their non-distracted 
counterparts. Although Kiesler and Mathog (1968) proposed a 
cognitive dissonance explanation for the effect of 
distraction on message 
consistent with an 
ability to scrutinize a 
peripheral cues. 
11 
acceptance, the results are also 
ELM view--reducing an individual's 
message will enhance the use of 
Like Petty and Cacioppo (1981, 1986), Gabrenya and 
Arkin (1979) also viewed information processing as taking 
place along a continuum of cognitive effort anchored by 
vigilant and non-vigilant processing. Chaiken (1980) 
reached similar conclusion, and labeled her two processing 
modes as systematic and heuristic. Research on these models 
is consistent with the major assumptions of the ELM. An 
individual's use of a less rather than more effortful 
information processing mode is a function of both the 
individual's motivation and ability· to process the message 
(Bodenhausen & Lichtenstein, 1987; Chaiken, 1980; Gabrenya & 
Arkin, 1979; Hogarth, 1980; Langer, Blank & Chanowitz, 1978; 
Payne, 1976; Taylor & Fiske, 1978; Tetlock, 1983). 
Overview and Hypotheses 
The present study is concerned with applying Petty and 
Cacioppo's ELM to the legal issue of whether jurors are 
capable fact-finders when asked to render a decision in a 
complex lawsuit. Whether jurors are capable fact-finders is 
an empirical question that should not be left to legal 
speculation. The present study assumed that a complex 
lawsuit, as with other complex tasks, will reduce jurors' 
ability to think about the evidence presented. It was 
12 
hypothesized that jurors who are exposed to a complex case 
will be more likely to engage in peripheral information 
processing than jurors who are exposed to a simple case. 
Although enough research has accumulated in support of the 
negative effect of task complexity, it is questionable 
whether such a finding may be generalized to a trial 
setting. At least one reason for concern is that a jury's 
motivation to reach a veridical opinion may be strong enough 
to override the negative effect of task complexity. The 
present research therefore, employed a jury simulation 
paradigm in which, it was believed, subjects would 
experience a high level of motivation. The present study 
also featured a measure for directly assessing subjects' use 
of a peripheral cue. One shortcoming of the research in 
this area has been its failure to measure directly whether 
individuals actually employed a peripheral cue. 
To a lesser extent, 'this study was concerned with 
testing a strategy for improving jurors' factfinding 
abilities. One argument favoring the exclusion of juries 
in complex cases is that they do not possess the 
factfinding tools available to a judge. When a case is 
tried without a jury, a judge is free to ask questions of 
witnesses, review evidence that would be excluded from a 
jury trial, and has the ability to consult trial 
transcripts (Blecher & Daniels, 1980; Withrow & Suggs, 
1988). However, instead of eliminating the use of juries 
13 
in complex cases because jurors do not possess a judge's 
factfinding tools, legal authors have suggested that jurors 
be allowed to use those same tools. 
One factfinding strategy that has been suggested is to 
provide the jury with a legal framework or schema from which 
to work. Psychological research supports the assumption 
that such frameworks enhance vigilant information processing 
(Elwork, Sales & Alfini, 1977; Hogarth, 1980). Hogarth 
(1980) found that individuals were more likely to engage in 
error filled heuristic processing in the absence of a 
procedural schema. More directly, Elwork, Sales & Alfini 
(1977) found that when jury instructions were given at the 
beginning of a trial, jurors were better able to recall 
evidence-related information. In light of past research, it 
was hypothesized that if jurors were given a legal framework 
prior to the case, the debilitating effects of complexity 
will be eliminated. 
METHOD 
Subjects 
Subjects were 59 male and 81 female undergraduate 
students who participated in the experiment as part of a 
course requirement for an introductory psychology class at 
Loyola University of Chicago. Prior to the main study, an 
additional 73 undergraduate students were recruited, and 
participated in a pilot test of the case summary, and the 
stereotype and complexity manipulations. Subjects were 
randomly assigned to experimental conditions in both the 
main study and pilot tests. 
Overview 
The present study asked subjects to read 1 of 8 
different summaries of a hypothetical medical malpractice 
lawsuit, and make a decision about the negligence of the 
defendant. In actuality, all summaries contained the same 
arguments and presented evidence which favored neither the 
plaintiff nor defendant, but differed with respect to the 
complexity of the case, presence or absence of a legal 
framework, and presence or absence of a strong peripheral 
cue. These three factors were the independent variables 
14 
15 
under study. Thus, the present study conformed to a 2 
(level of complexity: simple vs complex) x 2 (legal 
framework: present vs absent) x 2 (peripheral persuasion 
cue: present vs absent) factorial design. 
The peripheral cue was the defendant's foreign name 
which was designed to activate a negative stereotype of a 
doctor who was more likely to commit medical malpractice. 
In the peripheral cue conditions, subjects read about 
defendant Dr. Danish Rahmajani, and in the no peripheral cue 
conditions, subjects read about defendant Dr. James Morris. 
According to the major experimental hypothesis, when 
elaboration likelihood is high (simple case condition), 
subjects' verdicts would be based on a careful analysis of 
the arguments presented. Thus, a verdict in line with the 
evidence would reflect this mode of processing. However, 
when subjects' abilities to process the arguments centrally 
was impaired (complex case condition), their verdict would 
be based on a peripheral cue, such as the stereotype. A 
verdict in favor of the plaintiff (against the defendant) 
would exemplify this mode of processing. After rendering 
their verdict, subjects were asked to rate both how 
difficult it was to understand the case, and how important 
it was for them to do the best job they could, list their 
cognitive responses, answer a series of questions concerning 
the framework manipulation, and recall the arguments and 
evidence of the case. 
Legal Summary 
Subjects read a legal 
malpractice lawsuit brought 
16 
summary concerning a medical 
on behalf of the plaintiff, 
carol Ann Williams, against Or. James Morris (Or. Oenish 
Rahmajani), for injuries to Mrs. Williams' daughter 
following the delivery of the little girl. The plaintiff 
claimed that the actions of the defendant following the 
delivery of her daughter left her child irreversibly brain 
damaged. The expert witness for the plaintiff, Or. 
Michealson, argued in support of the plaintiff's claim that 
the defendant was negligent. The expert witness for the 
defendant, Or. Edwards, testified that the defendant 
exercised good judgment, and did not cause the plaintiff's 
injuries. (See Appendix for the complete transcript.) 
When writing the summary, special care was taken to 
insure that the defendant's name was the only peripheral cue 
that subjects could have used to reach their decision. 
Thus, both the simple and complex versions of the case were 
equated in terms of length and strength of the prosecution's 
and defense's arguments, and their expert witnesses' 
credentials. The equivalence of the cases for the 
prosecution and defense was assessed in a pilot test of the 
simple case with no stereotype, and no framework summary 
(the baseline summary). Of the 29 subjects who participated 
in the pilot test, 15 rendered a verdict in favor of the 
plaintiff and 14 decided in favor of the defendant. In 
17 
order to increase trial realism (Weinten & Diamond, 1977), 
subjects also read standard jury instructions on the 
applicable law for negligence in a medical malpractice 
lawsuit in Illinois (see Appendix). As in a real trial, 
these instructions were given to subjects after they read 
the case summary. 
Independent Variables 
Complex versus Simple Case. 
sufficiently complex to warrant an 
trial have been those where (a) 
Lawsuits viewed as 
exception to a jury 
the issues of the case 
required jurors to consider complicated financial and 
accounting principles or involved technical language unique 
to a particular field, (b) jurors would have to consider an 
overwhelming amount of evidence (e.g., in one case jurors 
were exposed to 240 witnesses and over 24,000 documents), 
and (c) jurors would have to keep track of a number of 
different claims for a number of different parties (e.g., in 
one case, five classes of plaintiffs filed suit against 20 
individual defendants and 80 corporate partnership 
defendants) (Withrow & Suggs, 1979). 
Based on these legal definitions of complexity and the 
fact that subjects had only 40 minutes to digest the facts 
of the case, complexity was operationally defined as 
language too technical for jurors to understand. 
Specifically, complexity was manipulated by presenting 
subjects with more (or less) medical terminology and less 
18 
(or more) definitions for the medical terms used. For 
example, in the simple case conditions, the defendant's 
expert witness alerted subjects to the consequence of 
providing too much oxygen to the baby in this manner, "Dr. 
Morris (Rahmajani) was also careful not to administer oxygen 
at levels in excess of 40%. Recent studies have indicated 
that the administration of supplemental oxygen in excess of 
40% can cause blindness in babies. This disease essentially 
occurs when too much oxygen is given to children and 
ultimately burns the arteries in the baby's retina causing 
blindness". In the complex case conditions, the peril of 
too much oxygen was described in this manner, "Dr. Morris 
(Rahmajani) was also careful not to ventilate the neonate at 
concentrations in excess of 40%. Recent studies have 
indicated that the provision of additional fractional 
inspired oxygen in excess of 40% can cause Retrolental 
Fibroplasia (RLF). RLF is a disease of the eyes related to 
hypoxemia. Vasoconstrictions as a result of very high 
concentrations of oxygen in retinal capillaries causes a 
wild overgrowth of these developing blood vessels; veins 
become numerous and dilate. The retina becomes edematous, 
and hemorrhages separate the retina from its attachment. 
Advanced scarring occurs from the retina to lens, destroying 
the normal architecture of the eye. This extensive retinal 
detachment and scarring result in irreversible blindness". 
19 
Legal Framework. The legal framework variable was 
manipulated by presenting subjects with the standard jury 
instructions for determining negligence in a medical 
malpractice lawsuit in Illinois either immediately after 
reading the legal summary (absence of a legal framework) or 
both before and after reading the legal summary (presence of 
a legal framework). Subjects in the legal framework 
condition therefore, read the standard jury instructions 
twice. 
Peripheral Cue. The manipulation of an irrelevant cue 
was accomplished by presenting subjects with a lawsuit 
concerning either a defendant whose foreign sounding name 
had the potential to activate a negative stereotype of a 
doctor who was likely to commit medical malpractice or whose 
name did not have such potential. In the peripheral 
cue/stereotype conditions, subjects read about Dr. Denish 
Rahmajani who was "a pediatrician practicing in Winston, 
Illinois. He was born in India and went to college and 
medical school there. He came here following graduation 
from medical school and did an internship and residency at 
Northwestern Memorial Hospital. He moved to Winston, 
Illinois in about 1960. He began treating patients there 
and has become a respected member of the community. 
published a number of articles in The Journal 
He has 
of The . 
American Academy of Pediatrics. Dr. Rahmajani is board 
certified as a specialist in pediatrics by the American 
Academy of Pediatricians." In 
20 
the no peripheral 
cue/stereotype conditions, subject read about Dr. James 
Morris who also was a pediatrician practicing in Winston, 
Illinois. He has been practicing there, treating babies, 
for 10 years. He attended medical school at Stanford 
University, and came to Winston following an internship and 
residency at Northwestern Memorial Hospital. He has become 
a respected member of the community. He published a number 
of articles in The Journal of The Academy of Pediatrics. 
Dr. James Morris was board certified as a specialist in 
pediatrics by the American Academy of Pediatricians." 
Procedure 
The experiment was conducted in a classroom large 
enough to accommodate group sessions of up to 15 subjects. 
After all the subjects who had signed up for a particular 
experimental session were seated, the experimenter began the 
session by explaining that the purpose of the experiment was 
"to find out how jurors vote in different types of law cases 
prior to deliberation." They were then told that "we would 
like you to read one of several different transcripts from 
an actual trial and then make a decision as to whether the 
defendant is or is not negligent." 
After being told the purpose and the general 
instructions for the experiment but before receiving the 
case summaries and four dependent measures booklets, 
subjects were asked to complete a brief questionnaire which 
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asked them for some background information. Subjects were 
told that "these questions were similar to what attorneys 
ask real jurors during what is called the voir dire phase of 
a trial." Specifically, this first dependent measures 
booklet required subjects to answer some demographic 
questions (e.g., sex, age, summer work experience), personal 
history questions (e.g., do you know any doctors, have you 
or any members of your family ever been involved in a 
medical malpractice case), and questions concerning their 
attitudes on the issues of medical malpractice and doctors 
performing cesarean sections. The questions concerning the 
issues of the case were designed to test whether subjects 
used the peripheral cue in reaching their decision or 
decided the case based on their preexisting attitudes on the 
issues of the case. According to the Elaboration Likelihood 
Model (Petty & Cacioppo, 1981), individuals use peripheral 
cues in decision making only when they are unable or 
unmotivated to think about both the content of the message 
and the issue(s) under consideration. In other words, if 
subjects were unable to think about the evidence and the 
arguments of the case, their verdicts may have been based 
on their preexisting attitudes on the issues of medical 
malpractice or performing cesarean sections rather than on 
the peripheral cue/stereotype . 
. 
After 3 minutes, the experimenter collected subjects' 
voir dire questionnaires and handed each subject a packet of 
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materials which contained the case summary followed by the 
judge's instructions to the jury and four dependent measures 
booklets labeled, Questionnaire #2, Questionnaire #3, 
Questionnaire #4, and Questionnaire #5 (Questionnaire #1 was 
the voir dire questionnaire). Subjects randomly received a 
written legal summary corresponding to 1 of the 8 
experimental conditions, e.g., complex case-stereotype-no 
legal framework. Physically, all of the experimental 
materials looked the same.. Thus, subjects were unaware that 
the person sitting next to them was reading a different 
case. 
After receiving the experimental materials, subjects 
were instructed to read the case and the judges' 
instructions which followed. The experimenter then went on 
to say, "After you have read the judge's instructions, 
please answer the rest of your questionnaires in the order 
that they appear. Note however, that because actual jurors 
are not allowed to retire to the jury room with any notes, 
you may not use your case booklet to answer the rest of your 
questionnaires." This latter instruction was included to 
eliminate the possibility of subjects reviewing the case 
materials while reaching a decision. 
The instructions the experimenter 
presence of a legal framework condition 
from those used for the absence of a 
used for the 
differed slightly 
legal framework 
condition. Because the jury instructions came before the 
case summary, subjects were told 
instructions first, and then, the case 
then instructed to reread the jury 
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to read the jury 
summary. They were 
instructions after 
reading the case, and before completing the four dependent 
measures booklets. 
Finally, the experimenter concluded her/his 
instructions by informing subjects that they had 40 minutes 
to read and digest the facts of the case. At the end of 40 
minutes, they would be expected to render a verdict 
(Questionnaire 
questionnaires. 
their dependent 
#2) and complete the remaining 
When all subjects had finished answering 
measures booklets, they were debriefed both 
orally and in writing. 
Dependent Measures 
The 4 questionnaire booklets contained 4 dependent 
measures and 4 manipulation check questions. Each measure 
appeared on a separate page. 
Verdict. Immediately after reading the judge's 
instructions, subjects rendered their verdict by placing a 
check next to 1 of 2 responses: "Do you: find in favor of 
the defendant, Dr. Morris (Dr. Rahmajani), and against the 
plaintiff, Mrs. Williams, or do you find in favor of the 
plaintiff, Mrs. Williams, and against the defendant, Dr. 
Morris (Dr. Rahmajani)." On the following page, subjects 
indicated their verdict again, but this time by specifying 
the degree to which they felt the defendant was or was not 
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negligent. Subjects marked how they felt on a 9 point scale 
anchored by not negligent at all (1), and definitely 
neg l i gent ( 9). 
Cognitive Responses. After completing the continuous 
verdict measure, subjects listed their cognitive responses 
in compliance to the request to "list the factors that you 
feel influenced your decision." Subjects' responses to the 
open-ended question were scored by two independent raters 
along the dimension of origin of responses made (Cacioppo, 
Harkins and Petty, 1981). 
The raters were trained to place each cognitive 
response (defined as a complete idea, thought or utterance) 
that subjects' listed into one of three origin categories: 
1) message-originated thoughts [direct restatements or 
paraphrases of the arguments and evidence presented in court 
(e.g., "The defendant did not perform the blood gas 
tests.")], 2) modified message originated thoughts 
[elaborations of, or replies to the evidence and arguments 
(e.g., "If the baby was so small, how could it possibly 
acquire air from a mask?")], and 3) recipient generated 
thoughts. This last major category was split into 2 
subcategories: 1) recipient generated thoughts which were 
statements expressing ideas or reactions not traceable 
directly to the specific arguments and evidence presented 
(e.g., "The plaintiff's attorney did a better job in 
describing and telling the exact details of the events."), 
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and 2) recipient generated thoughts which were responses 
pertinent to the issues but not to a specific argument or 
piece of evidence (e.g., "There are too many medical 
malpractice cases."). The two subcategories were created in 
order to better assess whether subjects reached a decision 
by employing the peripheral cue (scored as the first type of 
recipient generated thought) or by responding to the issues 
of the case (scored as the second type of recipient 
generated thought). 
The interrater reliability coefficients for the 
message originated thoughts and modified message originated 
thoughts categories were r=.82 and .80, respectively. For 
the recipient generated-no association to case thoughts 
category and the recipient generated-issue thoughts 
category, the interrater reliability coefficients were r = 
.92, and .98 respectively. 
Message Recall. The second dependent measures 
booklet (Questionnaire #3) contained 21 questions designed 
to test subjects' recall of the evidence and arguments of 
the case. Subjects read a question, such as "What can the 
administration of too much oxygen lead to?", and were 
expected to write the answer on a blank line immediately 
following the question. Although subjects were asked 21 
questions, several questions asked for more than one answer 
(e.g., "What are at least two different methods for 
determining if an infant is receiving proper levels of 
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? ") oxygen. . Thus, the total number of questions subjects 
could have answered correctly was 26. 
Manipulation Check Measures. Questionnaires 4 and 5, 
together, contained 4 manipulation check measures for 
assessing whether the various independent variables 
operated as intended. The first series of questions in 
Questionnaire # 4 provided a test of the framework 
manipulation. It was reasoned that if the framework 
manipulation was found to have no effect on subjects' 
verdict, one explanation for such a finding might be that 
subjects' did not understand the instructions as written. 
Based on the assumption that a "legally correct" verdict 
could only be reached if subjects understood the judge's 
instructions, a measure of the correctness of subjects' 
verdict was taken. A correct verdict is one that adheres 
to the specific legal criteria (the applicable law) for 
determining negligence outlined in the judge's 
instructions. According to the judge's instructions, a 
verdict in favor of the plaintiff (defendant) can only be 
reached if a juror finds that (a) the defendant's conduct 
was not (was) in conformity with the standard of care 
exercised by reasonably well qualified physicians (this is 
a form of negligence called malpractice), and (or) (b) one 
or more of the ways in which the plaintiff claims that the 
defendant was negligent was (was not) the proximate cause 
of the claimed injuries. Using this criteria, subjects' 
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pattern of responding to a series of no-yes questions 
(e.g., "Was Dr. Morris' conduct in conformity with the 
standard of care exercised by reasonably well qualified 
physicians practicing in the same locality?; Is a lack of 
oxygen a proximate cause of the newborn baby's injuries?'') 
was scored as indicating that they reached their verdict 
either correctly or incorrectly. A verdict was scored as 
"correct," if the answers to the framework questions were 
in line with the legal criteria specified in the 
instructions. If subjects' answers to the framework 
questions were inconsistent with the legal criteria 
outlined in the judge's instructions, their verdict was 
scored as "incorrect." 
The complexity manipulation was checked by asking 
subjects to indicate on a 9 point scale anchored by not 
difficult at all (1) and very difficult (9), how difficult 
the case was to understand. Subjects' level of motivation 
was assessed next by asking subjects to rate how important 
it was to them to do the best they could, using a 9 point 
scale ranging from (1) not at all to (9) extremely 
important. A measure of subjects' level of motivation was 
taken for two reasons. First, the major hypothesis assumed 
that subjects' motivation would be high, but that a high 
level of motivation would not be enough to overcome the 
negative effect of complexity. Second, ability reducing 
variables like complexity can affect individuals' motivation 
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to process information thoroughly (Chaiken, 1987). Thus, in 
the present case, complexity may have caused subjects' to 
use the stereotype not because it interfered with message 
attention or comprehension directly but because it lowered 
subjects' motivation to process the case centrally. 
The last questionnaire contained 16 questions for 
determining the equivalance of the opposing arguments. The 
objective was to see if subjects viewed all actors (i.e., 
plaintiff, defendant, attorneys and expert witnesses) as 
equally credible, difficult to understand, and likeable, and 
hence, did not reach a decision solely due to the fact that 
one attorney (expert witness) was more credible (likeable, 
difficult to understand) than another. In short, the 
measure was designed to test for the presence of any 
additional peripheral cues other than the stereotype which 
may have accounted for differences among subjects' verdicts. 
Using a 9 point scale anchored by not at all (1) and very 
(9), subjects rated the following: the likability, 
credibility and difficulty of attorneys' and expert 
witnesses' arguments. 
The questions pertaining 
likability and difficultly of any 
to 
one 
the credibility, 
particular actor 
(i.e., 
witness, 
plaintiff 
plaintiff's expert witness, defendant's expert 
plaintiff's attorney, defendant's 
and defendant), appeared together 
attorney, 
on the same 
page of the questionnaire. Thus, on the first page of this 
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booklet, subjects answered how they felt regarding the 
credibility, likability and difficulty of one actor, and on 
the next page they answered the same series of questions but 
with respect to a different actor. Furthermore, to control 
for fatigue, the different question sets were rotated 
throughout the questionnaire according to the Latin Square 
technique. 
RESULTS 
This study assessed the effect of 3 independent 
variables (case complexity--simple vs complex, peripheral 
cue--present vs absent, and framework--present vs absent) 
on 4 major dependent variables: subject's verdicts, 
judgments of the defendant's negligence, cognitive 
responses, and argument recall. Based on previous research 
(Bodenhausen, 1988; Chaiken, 1980; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), 
subjects' sex was not expected to either interact with the 
factors under study or directly (or indirectly) affect the 
dependent variables. Thus, the effect of sex was not 
analyzed. 
Check on Experimental Conditions. The research 
design was expected to satisfy several situational 
conditions which would allow for a meaningful 
interpretation of the data. One such condition was that 
subjects would be highly motivated to process information 
centrally. The overall mean on the motivation rating 
revealed that subjects were, indeed, highly motivated to do 
the best job they could CM = 7.78 on a 9 point scale). 
Furthermore a three way ANOVA performed on the motivation 
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variable did not yield a significant main effect for case 
complexity or 
unlikely that 
any significant interactions. Thus, it was 
subjects' use of the peripheral information 
was due to reduced motivation. 
A second condition of the research design was that the 
case summary would be free from any additional persuasion 
factors which could also operate as peripheral cues. This 
condition was assessed by looking at subjects' ratings of 
the credibility, likability, and difficulty of the 
defendant, plaintiff, both expert witnesses and both 
attorneys. Paired t-tests performed on each of the 
credibility, likability and difficulty ratings for each 
adversary pair (i.e., defendant's-plaintiff's attorney, 
defendant's-plaintiff's expert witness, and defendant-
plaintiff) in both the base line simple and complex case 
conditions (no framework and no stereotype), yielded no 
significant differences between the pairs. All 
participants in the lawsuit, as compared to their 
counterpart, were viewed as equally credible, likable and 
difficult to understand. 
Of central importance to the study was the notion that 
the defendant's foreign sounding name could evoke a negative 
stereotype of a doctor who was more likely to commit medical 
malpractice. This assumption was tested through a pilot 
test of the stereotype manipulation. Determination of 
whether the desired negative stereotype could be produced by 
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the name Dr. Rahmajani was reached by assessing subjects' 
responses to 8 likelihood questions [e.g., "using the 7 
point scale below, how likely is it that Dr. Rahmajani (or 
Dr. John T.) will be the next president of the 
American Medical Association; sued for medical malpractice; 
discover a cure for cancer"], and 8 bipolar trait adjective 
pairs concerning either Dr. Rahmajani or Dr. John T. [e.g., 
"rate how you feel about Dr. Rahmajhani ·(or Dr. John T.) as 
a surgeon: competent-incompetent; trustworthy-untrustworthy; 
precise-careless"]. 
Regarding the likelihood statements, the statement 
concerning Dr. Rahmajani's and Dr. John T.'s likelihood to 
commit medical malpractice was the only measure of interest. 
As such, this was the only likelihood statement analyzed. 
The other questions were ·included to conceal the purpose of 
the pilot test. As expected, subjects believed that Dr. 
Rahmanjani would be more likely to be sued for medical 
malpractice (M = 5.14) than Dr. John T. (M = 3.95), ~(40) = 
1.87, Q < .05, one-tailed. At-test performed on subjects' 
summed responses to the bipolar trait adjective pairs 
produced similar results. Again, Dr. Rahmajani (M = 1.73) 
was viewed more negatively than Dr. John T CM= 5.90), t(40) 
= 2.08, Q < .05, one-tailed. 
Analyses performed on the ~anipulation check measures 
for the independent variables of case complexity and 
framework revealed that these manipulations were also 
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successful. Indeed, subjects who read the complex case 
summary felt that the case was significantly more difficult 
to understand (M = 5.20) than subjects who read the simple 
case summary (M = 3.65), f(1,135) = 18.15, Q < .01. 
Finally, contrary to previous research (Elwork, Sales 
& Alfini, 1977), the standard jury instructions for 
determining negligence in a medical malpractice case, at 
least, in Illinois were found to be quite understandable. 
The understandability of the jury instructions was assessed 
by looking at the "legal correctness" of subjects' verdicts. 
A legally correct verdict could only be reached if subjects 
understood the instructions. 
framework questions were 
If subjects' answers to the 
inconsistent with the legal 
criteria outlined in the judge's instructions, their verdict 
was scored as "incorrect." A verdict was scored as 
"correct," if the answers to the framework questions were in 
line with the legal criteria specified in the instructions. 
A log linear analysis of the correctness measure produced no 
significant main effects or interactions. In each of the 
cells of the design, the majority of verdicts rendered were 
legally correct or consistent with the applicable law for 
negligence, and the overall percent correct was 80 %. 
Verdict. According to the major hypotheses, a 
complex legal case will engender nonvigilant information 
processing or the use of peripheral cues in a decision 
making situation. However, jurors will not rely on 
34 
peripheral cues for reaching a decision if they are 
presented with an ability enhancing strategy, such as a 
legal framework, prior to hearing a complex case. The two 
major hypotheses, therefore, implied a Case Complexity by 
Peripheral cue interaction (subjects who read the complex 
case will be more likely than subjects who read the simple 
case to render a verdict against the defendant when the 
stereotype is present), and a Case Complexity by Peripheral 
Cue by Legal Framework interaction (the highest ratings of 
negligence will occur in the complex case, stereotype and no 
framework condition). 
Subjects' ratings of the defendant's negligence were 
analyzed by a 2 (Case Complexity) X 2 (Peripheral Cue) X 2 
(Legal Framework) ANOVA. 2 Subjects' ratings of the 
defendant's negligence appear in Table 1. The results 
showed a significant main effect for Legal Framework, 
£(1,137) = 6.68, Q = .01, and two significant two-way 
interactions: Peripheral Cue by Legal Framework, f(1,137) 
= 4.47, Q < 
£(1,137)= 
.05, and Case Complexity by Legal Framework, 
4.33, Q < .05. The three-way interaction did 
not reach significance, £(1,137) = 3.04, ns. 
The main effect for legal framework indicated that 
subjects who read the case transcript without benefit of a 
legal framework judged the defendant as more negligent (M = 
4.91) than subjects who possessed a legal framework while 
reading the case (M = 3.85). The means associated with the 
Table 1 
Mean Ratings of Defendant's Negligence as a Function of 
Case Complexity, Stereotype, and Legal Framework 
Framework 
Present Absent 
Stereotype Present Absent Present Absent 
Task Complexity 
Simple 
Complex 
4.65 
( 1 7) 
2.82 
( 1 7) 
4.53 
(17) 
3.41 
( 1 7 ) 
5.33 
( 18) 
6.00 
( 1 7 ) 
Note. Higher numbers indicate greater degree of 
negligence. Cell n's are in parentheses. 
4.28 
( 18) 
4.06 
(17) 
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Peripheral Cue by Legal Framework interaction are presented 
in Figure 1. As the Figure and post hoc tests indicated, 
while in possession of a legal framework, the stereotype had 
no effect on subjects' ratings of the defendant's 
negligence, f(1,137) = .16, ns. However, in the absence of 
a legal framework, subjects who were exposed to the 
stereotype judged the defendant as more negligent (M = 
5.66) than subjects who were not exposed to the stereotype 
CM= 4.17), EC1,137) = 7.07, Q < .01. Thus, it appears 
that a legal framework precluded the use of a stereotype. 
Figure 2 illustrates the Case Complexity by Legal Framework 
interaction. Post hoc tests revealed that, contrary to the 
major hypotheses, no differences were found between 
complexity conditions in the absence of a legal framework, 
f(1,137) = .15, ns. However, when given a legal framework, 
individuals who read the complex case judged the defendant 
as significantly less rlegligent CM= 3.12) than individuals 
who read the simple case (M = 4.59), f(1,137) = 6.43, Q < 
.05. Thus, the framework seemed to influence the manner in 
which individuals processed complex information but not 
simple information. 
A second analysis was performed on subjects' 
dichotomous judgments of the defendant's negligence or the 
verdict measure. The percentages of subjects who voted in 
favor of the defendant for each condition are reported in 
Table 2. The results of a log linear analysis partially 
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and Legal Framework. Higher numbers mean greater 
negligence. 
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mean 
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Table 2 
Percentage of Subjects who Rendered a Verdict Against the 
Defendant as a Function of Case Complexity, Stereotype, and 
Legal Framework 
Stereotype 
Task Complexity 
Simple 
Complex 
Framework 
Present 
Present Absent 
42 
( 1 7) 
18 
( 1 7) 
42 
( 1 7 ) 
24 
( 1 7 ) 
Absent 
Present Absent 
56 
( 18) 
71 
( 1 7) 
50 
( 18) 
42 
( 1 7) 
Note. Numbers indicate percentage of subjects who voted 
against the defendant. Cell n's are in parentheses. 
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confirmed the findings obtained in the previous analysis. 
The only factor that significantly added to the fit of the 
model was the Case Complexity by Legal Framework 
interaction x ( 1 ) = 3.84, Q < . 05. As before, the 
interaction indicated that only while subjects were in 
possession of a legal framework did the complexity of the 
case have an affect on their verdicts. A higher proportion 
of subjects who read the complex case with the benefit of a 
legal framework as compared to no framework, voted in favor 
of the defendant (79% vs 44%). 
Cognitive Responses and Attitudes toward Medical 
Malpractice Cases. A direct test of subjects' use of the 
stereotype was conducted by first counting the number of 
message originated thoughts, modified message originated 
thoughts, recipient generated-no association to case 
thoughts and recipient generated-issue related thoughts 
that each subject listed. Subjects were then identified as 
processing the information presented by way of "scrutinizing 
the message" (either more message originated thoughts or 
modified message originated thoughts than the other types of 
thoughts), "peripheral cues" (more recipient generated-no 
association to case thoughts than the other types of 
thoughts), "case related issues'' (more recipient generated-
issue related thoughts than other types of thoughts) or 
"mixed mode'' (an equal number of the different types of 
cognitive thoughts possible). Subjects' mode of information 
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processing used was explained by using log linear analysis. 
Although the continuous verdict measure provided some 
evidence that subjects relied on the peripheral 
cue/stereotype for reaching their decision in the no 
framework condition, the results of this analysis indicated 
no differences in information processing among the different 
experimental conditions. As Table 3 shows, regardless of 
case complexity, presence or absence of a framework and 
stereotype, the overwhelming majority of thoughts listed 
were either message originated or modified message 
originated thoughts. 
Argument Recall. According to the ELM, ability 
reducing variables prevent individuals from attending to 
and/or comprehending the message presented. As such, 
ability reducing variables should affect individuals' 
recall of a message. In the present study, therefore, 
subjects who read a simple case should recall more 
arguments and facts (correctly) than subjects who read a 
complex case. The number of facts and arguments that 
subjects can recall correctly also provides a test of the 
processes underlying the positive effect of the framework 
manipulation. Theoretically, a framework cancels out the 
negative effect of complexity because a framework enables 
individuals to identify the relevant aspects of the 
message. In short, a framework increases subjects ability 
to attend to the message. As such, individuals who are 
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Table 3 
Type of Information Processing Mode Used as a Function of 
' 
Case Complexity, Stereotype, and Legal Framework 
Stereotype 
Simple Case 
Scrutinized Message 
Peripheral Cues 
Issue Related 
Mixed Mode 
Complex 
Scrutinized Message 
Peripheral Cues 
Issue Related 
Mixed Mode 
Framework 
Present 
94 
6 
( 1 6 ) 
94 
6 
( 1 6 ) 
Present Absent 
100 
( 1 7) 
94 
6 
( 17) 
Absent 
86 
7 
7 
( 15) 
100 
( 1 7) 
Present Absent 
100 
( 1 7) 
88 
6 
6 
(16) 
Note. Numbers indicate percentage of subjects who 
generated predominatly message originated or modified 
message originated thoughts (scrutinzed the message), no 
association to case thoughts (peripheral cues), issue 
related thoughts (issue related), or an equal number of 
message originated/modified message originated and no 
association/issue related thoughts. Cell n's are in 
parentheses. 
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given a legal framework prior to hearing the case should 
recall more facts and arguments correctly than individuals 
who are not given a legal framework prior to reading the 
case. 
The total number of facts and arguments that subjects 
recalled correctly, out of a possible 26 items, was 
calculated. Subjects' scores were then analyzed by a 2 
(case complexity) X 2 (legal framework) X 2 (peripheral 
cue) analysis of variance. The overall mean was M = 18.03. 
No significant differences among experimental conditions 
were found. 
Other Analyses. In order to better understand the 
effect of the framework manipulation, a three-way ANOVA was 
performed on subjects' ratings of the difficulty of the 
case. It was expected that the framework would make the 
complex case more understandable. The analysis produced a 
significant main effect for framework. Subjects who 
received the jury instructions prior to reading the case 
rated the case as less difficult to understand (M = 4.06) 
than subjects who did not receive the jury instructions 
prior to reading the case (M = 4.78), f(1,136) = 4.07, Q < 
.05. Although the framework manipulation, overall, made the 
case less difficult to understand, the Case Complexity by 
Legal Framework interaction implied by the prediction w,as 
not significant, f(1,136) = .005, ns. 
DISCUSSION 
On a theoretical level, the purpose of the present 
study was to assess both the generalizability of the ELM to 
a legal setting and its utility as a general framework for 
understanding when and how individuals process information. 
On an applied level, this study sought to address the legal 
question of whether jurors are capable fact-finders when 
asked to render a decision in a complex lawsuit. In 
accordance with the major assumptions of the ELM, it was 
hypothesized that a complicated legal case would reduce 
subjects' ability to scrutinize the legal arguments 
presented in court, and enhance the use of a less effortful 
information processing strategy. It was also hypothesized 
that if jurors were presented with an ability-enhancing 
strategy, such as the judge's instructions prior to reading 
the complex transcript, the detrimental effect of complexity 
would be eliminated. This study also attempted to provide a 
direct test of subjects' use of 
regard, it was hypothesized 
peripheral cues. In this 
that subjects' inability to 
elaborate on the content of the case would be reflected in 
the cognitive responses they generated. 
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Overall, the 
inconsistent with an ELM 
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results of this study were not 
account of the ability-limiting 
factor of complexity, but the data provided only partial 
support for the major hypotheses. Consistent with the 
major assumptions of the ELM, a legal framework reduced the 
use of peripheral cues. The results of this study showed 
that while in possession of a legal framework, the presence 
or absence . of stereotypic information had no effect on 
subjects' judgments of the defendant's negligence. Quite 
unexpectedly, however, in the absence of a legal framework, 
all subjects, regardless of case complexity, relied on the 
stereotype. Thus, while this finding suggests that reading 
the judge's instructions prior to reading the case 
transcript enabled subjects to process the simple and 
complex cases centrally, it also appears, that when 
available, individuals will use stereotypic information for 
reaching a decision in the absence of a legal framework. 
One explanation for the considerable influence of the 
stereotype on subjects' decisions, and the lack of an impact 
of the complexity manipulation is that both the simple and 
complex cases where equally complex--complex in terms of 
ambiguity rather than understandability of the evidence. A 
second "complex" property of the legal transcript used in 
this study may have been the "closeness" of the case. 
Thus, while the complex transcript may have been more 
difficult to understand than the simple case transcript (as 
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the analysis of the difficulty measure revealed), both 
cases may have been equally difficult in terms of reaching 
~ decision. This latter operationalization of case 
difficulty was not assessed. However, the results of the 
credibility, likability and difficulty ratings of the 
adversary pairs suggests that both parties to the dispute 
presented equally compelling and cogent arguments. This 
finding is further substantiated by the results from the 
dichotomous verdict measure taken in the base-line simple 
case. In the base-line simple case, 50 % of the subjects 
voted for the defendant, and 50 % voted for the plaintiff. 
In their review of the literature on stereotypes, 
Bodenhausen and Lichtenstein, (1987) noted that "stereotypes 
will be influential whenever other evidence fails to provide 
clear and direct implications for the judgment" (p. 871). 
This point of view is also consistent with an ELM view of 
the impact of stereotypes on decisions. Another treatment 
variable that can also enhance or reduce an individual's 
motivation or ability to process information centrally is 
the nature of the message. As in the present case, a 
message with vague or ambiguous implications can also induce 
a peripheral information processing route (Petty & Cacioppo, 
1987). 
Although it is plausible that both the complex and 
simple case transcripts were perceived as equally difficult 
in terms of reaching a decision, this explanation is 
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somewhat inadequate because it runs contrary to the second 
finding that a legal framework affects the manner in which 
information in the complex, but not simple, case was 
processed. If both transcripts were equally complex, the 
legal framework manipulation would have had the same impact 
on judgments rendered in both cases. Although the pattern 
of negligence judgments presented in Table 1 suggests that 
the legal framework, overall, lowered subjects' ratings of 
the defendant's negligence, the framework manipulation had a 
much more powerful impact on negligence judgments rendered 
in the complex case condition than in the simple case 
condition. In fact, negligence judgments rendered in the 
complex case, framework condition dropped well below the 
baseline judgment. 
One explanation that would account for both findings 
is that the two transcripts, although complex, were not 
equally complex, and the two levels of complexity resulted 
in an information processing difference. Although the 
simple case was complex enough to engender the use of the 
stereotype, it was not complex enough to warrant closer 
scrutiny of the evidence. On the other hand, the complex 
transcript was undeniably complex, and necessitated further 
examination of the arguments which the second exposure to 
the judge's instructions offered. In essence, the framework 
manipulation may have had the same effect on information 
processing as the ability enhancing variable of repetition. 
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According to Petty and Cacioppo (1979), the benefits of 
repetition are most apparent when additional opportunities 
are needed to process a message, as when reading a complex 
lawsuit. What may have occurred in the complex case 
condition is that, after reading the judge's instructions 
and then reading the complex transcript, subjects were still 
uncertain of their decision, and additional opportunities 
to process the message arguments were needed. The second 
reading of the judge's instructions provided this 
opportunity, and subjects took advantage of it unlike the 
subjects in the simple case condition who were also exposed 
to the judge's instructions two times. During the second 
reading of the judge's instructions, subjects in the complex 
case condition who were uncertain of their decision, 
diligently searched the instructions for information that 
would provide them with an answer to the case, while 
subjects in the simple case condition who were certain of 
their decision, just gave the instructions a passing glance. 
Such an explanation implies, however, that the 
opposite pattern of cognitive responding and message recall 
than the one predicted should emerge. Thus, only in the 
complex case, framework condition should greater recall of 
the message arguments, and more message 
modified message originated thoughts 
generated or issue irrelevant thoughts 
originated or 
than recipient 
be observed. 
However, this pattern of responding did not occur. In fact, 
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neither the cognitive response nor the recall measures 
detected any differences in argument processing among the 
experimental conditions. While these results may indicate 
that all subjects processed the case centrally, the measures 
also may have been inappropriate for the aims of the 
particular experiment. The wording of the cognitive 
response item may have primed subjects to list only the 
facts of the case. For the main study, the pilot study's 
version of the cognitive response item was shortened from: 
"please list all the thoughts you had while 
hearing the case and reaching your decision. 
List the thoughts you may have had regarding 
what was said and/or not said during the trial. 
Just try to remember and write down all the 
different kinds of thoughts that may have 
crossed your mind while reading and reaching 
your decision." 
to "please list all the factors that influenced your 
decision." With the latter instruction, subjects literally 
generated a listing of the facts of the case while the 
former measure produced paragraphs of thoughts (e.g., "Is it 
an act of God? Why did the doctor take two hours to get to 
the emergency? How bad was the car accident?" "The baby 
didn't seem like it was in critical condition so the doctor 
was calm about the situation."). The difference is not 
surprising. Survey researchers have known for a long time 
that a longer opened-ended question will elicited a longer 
response (Sudman & Bradburn, 1985). 
The responses elicited by the recall measure also 
showed no variation. An alternative explanation for these 
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results may be that the easy to understand judge's 
instructions and attorneys' opening arguments (only the 
expert witnesses' statements were made more complex) 
provided subjects with all the information they needed for 
answering the recall questions. Their knowledge of the case 
which was gathered from the attorneys' opening arguments and 
judge's instructions, however, was not enough for subjects 
who were exposed to the complex case to feel confident about 
rendering a verdict. A test of this explanation would 
require the use of the longer version of the cognitive 
response item and a confidence measure. 
On the other hand, the results of the cognitive 
response and recall measures may truely indicate that all 
subjects, regardless of experimental condition, actually 
processed the case centrally, and the ambiguity of the case 
together with the complexity of the case triggered the use 
of either a relevant or peripheral cue. In the absence of a 
legal framework, the ambiguity of the case engendered the 
use of the stereotype. In the presence of a legal 
framework, however, the framework became the "peripheral'' 
cue, although a relevant one, eliminating the effect of the 
stereotype, and leading to a more effortful processing of 
the complex case. According to this explanation, subjects 
use of the framework occured during processing rather than 
after processing the case, but before delivering a decision. 
What may have occurred is that, while reading the 
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complex transcript, subjects felt uncertain about their 
ability to render a verdict, and relied more heavily on the 
legal framework. Thus, subjects read or processed the 
complex case in terms of the legal criteria outlined in the 
judge's instructions. Since the framework provided a clear 
and stringent definition of negligence, subjects were less 
likely to find a clear case of negligence. Conversely, 
while reading the simple transcript, subjects felt 
confident about their ability to render a verdict. And, 
since the case arguments could be easily processed, 
subjects did not feel the need for greater cognitive 
effort. 
On a theoretical 
the applicability of 
understanding of how and 
level, 
the 
when 
these findings demonstrated 
ELM of persuasion to an 
individuals will engage in 
effortful versus effortless information processing. On an 
applied level, these findings appear to indicate that close 
or equally matched lawsuits are inherently complex, and 
thus, provide the perfect environment for inducing the use 
of cues--relevant or peripheral. In fact, it appears that 
the more uncertain individuals are about a message or 
decision, the more likely it is that they will process the 
message in light of situational cues. Futhermore, this 
research suggests that cues may operate as facilitators of 
greater cognitive effort. In the present situation, the 
judge's instructions not only reduced the use of a 
peripheral cue (reliance 
52 
on a less effortful mode of 
but also, under conditions of high information processing), 
uncertainty resulted 
processing. 
in more central information 
Future research might profitably explore the 
relationship between uncertainty and cognitive effort; 
specifically, whether high motivation and uncertainty, when 
accompanied by a strategy for reducing uncertainty might 
result in greater cognitive effort than that expended under 
conditions of certainty. In addition, research should be 
carried out for ascertaining other legal tactics for 
inducing more central information processing strategies 
especially, for use with more routine lawsuits which are not 
traditionally labeled as complex. 
FOOTNOTES 
1. Saks' findings are based solely on a review of the 
literature on small group decision making. He emphasizes 
that, to date, there have been no direct tests of the 
differences between judges and juries capabilities to try 
complex lawsuits. As such, he emphatically states that, 
"the conclusions of this report should be considered as 
'best available guesses' based on imperfect information" 
( p. 1 , Saks, 1 981 ) . 
2. Two subjects were eliminated from the analysis because 
their dependent measures booklets referred to a defendant 
who was different from the one they read about. 
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APPENDIX A 
I. Text of the Simple Legal Summary 
IN THE CIRCUIT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS 
COUNTY DEPARTMENT, LAW DIVISION 
CAROL ANN WILLIAMS, as mother ) 
and next friend of LISA WILLIAMS,) 
a minor, ) 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JAMES MORRIS, M.D., 
(DENISH RAHMAJANI, M.D.,) 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
No.: 85 L 12397 
SUMMARY OF THE TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
OPENING REMARKS BY JUDGE MEYERS 
Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury: the first step in the 
proceedings was what was known as voir dire. This is the 
period during which the attorneys had an opportunity to ask 
questions of the jurors regarding your ability to hear this 
case. After questioning more than 65 potential jurors, you 
twelve jurors and two altenatives were empanelled to hear 
the evidence in this case. This is a medical malpractice 
action brought by Carol Ann Williams, on behalf of her 
daughter, Lisa Williams, against Dr. James Morris (Dr. 
59 
Denish Rahmajani). 
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The attorneys for both parties now have 
an opportunity to provide you with their opening statements. 
The opening statement is designed to give you an idea of 
what the case is all about and what the evidence is expected 
to show. Mr. Martin, the attorney for Mrs. Williams, will 
address you first. 
OPENING STATEMENT BY COUNSEL 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF, THOMAS C. MARTIN 
Ladies and gentlemen, as Judge Meyers told you this is a 
medical negligence action that has been brought on behalf of 
my client, Carol Ann Williams, against Dr. James Morris (Dr. 
Denish Rahmajani), for injuries to Mrs. Williams' daughter, 
Lisa, following the delivery of the little girl on February 
20, 1983. The evidence in this case will show that the 
actions of Dr. Morris (Rahmajani) following the delivery of 
Lisa, left her hopelessly and irreversibly brain damaged. 
The evidence will ~lso show that Dr. Morris' (Rahmajani) 
actions were deviations from the standard of care of doctors 
in the community. 
My client, Carol Ann Williams, at age 35, was pregnant 
with her first child. During the course of her pregnancy, 
Mrs. Williams was under the care of Dr. James, her 
obstetrician. Her expected 
1983. On February 20, 1983, 
date of delivery was April 15, 
however, just following her 
seventh month of pregnancy, Mrs. Williams was involved in a 
minor automobile accident and experienced a preterm rupture 
of the membranes. 
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She drove herself to Winston Community 
Hospital in Winston, Illinois, where she was admitted to the 
labor room. She had already begun to have contractions. 
This indicated that labor was underway. Several hours 
later, the nurse on duty in the labor and delivery room 
detected a passage of meconium in the amniotic fluid and 
called Dr. James, Mrs. Williams' obstetrician, on the 
telephone. The passage of meconium meant that the baby was 
in trouble or, in clincial terms, experiencing fetal 
distress. Dr. James called the defendant, Dr. James Morris 
(Dr. Denish Rahmajani), a pediatrician with whom Mrs. 
Williams had made arrangements to care for her child 
following birth. Dr. Morris (Rahmajani) told Dr. James to 
have the nurse place Mrs. Williams on an electronic fetal 
heart monitoring device, which was done. 
(Rahmajani) did not arrive at the 
However, Dr Morris 
hospital until 
approximately 1:15 p.m.--two hours later. When he arrived, 
Dr. Morris (Rahmajani) examined Carol Ann. His clinical 
examination of the baby and his examination of the print-out 
strip from the fetal heart monitor confirmed that the baby 
was in distress. The examination revealed that the baby was 
having problems breathing, and its heart rate was dropping. 
Forty-five minutes later, Lisa was delivered by cesarean 
section. Upon birth, Lisa weighed 2 lbs., and was having 
difficulty breathing. Lisa was then turned over to Dr. 
Morris (Rahmajani) who was in the delivery room. Dr. Morris 
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(Rahmajani) and his nurse attempted to suction the baby to 
clear her lungs, and began administering 100% oxygen by an 
ordinary bag and mask method. They administered oxygen for 
five minutes. At no time was an endotraceal tube used as a 
means of placing oxygen into Lisa's lungs to help her 
breathe. 
A short time later, Dr. Morris (Rahmajani) discontinued 
the oxygen and had Lisa taken to the nursery. As you will 
hear later, Dr. Morris (Rahmajani) claims that he instructed 
the nursing staff to carry out his routine orders. Those 
orders included placing Lisa in a heated incubator, and most 
importantly, to supply the baby with oxygen at a level of 
only 30%. However, as the evidence will show, the 30% 
oxygen level given to Lisa was too low to prevent brain 
damage. 
Lisa remained in the 
first three weeks, Dr. 
administer oxygen to Lisa 
nursery for two months. For the 
Morris (Rahmajani) continued to 
at a level of 30%. Throughout 
this time, he claims to have visited Lisa three times a day. 
On March 15, 1983, Dr. Morris (Rahmajani) went on 
vacation for three weeks. He asked his associate, Dr. 
Patel, to follow Lisa. Before leaving, Dr. Morris 
(Rahmajani) decreased the level of oxygen to 25%. Five days 
later, Lisa was noted as making shallow breathing sounds and 
periodic grunting noises. Dr. Patel increased the oxygen 
level to 30% where it stayed for two weeks. When Dr. Morris 
63 
(Rahmajani) returned from vacation, he decided that Lisa 
could be discharged. 
Once Lisa was home however, her mother began to notice 
problems. Carol Ann first noticed that her baby was not 
developing as a normal infant should have developed. She 
began to notice that the baby was not able to control her 
hand, head, and arm movements, and was not able to hold on 
to toys and bottles with her hands. She also noticed that 
Lisa was crying out at various times throughout the day and 
night for no apparent reason. Her mother became worried and 
concerned. Lisa was taken back to the hospital on May 26, 
1983, for an outpatient visit. It was on this visit that 
Dr. Morris (Rahmajani) first determined that the baby was 
suffering from brain damage. 
Today, Lisa is three years and six months old. She has 
no awareness of who she is. Although she has grown in 
height and weight at a relatively normal rate, she is not 
able to walk, and she is not able to reach, climb, or hold 
on to any objects. She has to be diapered, and she is 
totally dependent upon her parents and nurses for her care. 
She is going to require a lifetime of care by her parents, 
nurses, rehabilitation specialists, and family members. 
This lawsuit has been brought against Dr. Morris 
(Rahmajani) for causing Lisa's brain damage. You will hear 
expert medical testimony from Dr. Michaelson, an 
exceptionally well qualified pediatrician, who will explain 
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determine the level of oxygen in Lisa's blood. Laboratory 
tests known as blood gas studies would have provided more 
accurate and reliable information about whether Lisa was 
receiving a sufficient level of oxygen. These were not 
done. 
Finally, Dr. Morris (Rahmajani) was negligent in failing 
to transfer Lisa to a hospital with a new born intensive 
care unit. Winston Community Hospital does not have such 
facilities but Dr. Morris (Rahmajani) knew that Northwestern 
Memorial Hospital did, and therefore, knowing the potential 
for problems, he should have ordered a transfer. 
In this case, Lisa's brain damage was caused by the 
negligence of Dr. Morris (Rahmajani). We will show how this 
occurred through the testimony of the witnesses. At the 
close of all the evidence, you will be asked to render a 
verdict in favor of Carol Ann and Lisa Williams, and against 
the defendant, Dr. James Morris (Dr. Denish Rahmajani). 
Thank you very much for your attention. 
OPENNING STATEMENT BY 
MR. MONTGOMERY, COUNSEL FOR DR. MORRIS (Rahmajani) 
Ladies and gentlemen, my name is Bill Montgomery, and I 
represent Dr. Morris (Rahmajani). What this case is about 
is whether this little baby's condition was caused by the 
malpractice of my client, Dr. James Morris (Dr. Denish 
Rahmajani). What the evidence will really show in this case 
is that Dr. Morris (Rahmajani) was confronted with an 
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emergency situation with a little baby that weighed less 
than two pounds, and that his efforts saved Lisa's life. 
Dr. Morris is a pediatrician practicing in Winston, 
Illinois. He has been practicing there, treating babies, 
for 10 years. He attended medical school at Stanford 
University, and came to Winston following an internship and 
residency at Northwestern Memorial Hospital. He has become 
a respected member of the community. He has published a 
number of articles in The Journal of The American Academy of 
Pediatrics. Dr. Morris is Board Certified as a specialist 
in pediatrics by the American Academy of Pediatricians. 
(Dr. Rahmajani is a pediatrician practicing in Winston, 
Illinois. He was born in India and went to college and 
medical school there. He came here following graduation 
from medical school and did an internship and residency at 
Northwestern University Hospital. He moved to Winston, 
Illinois in about 1960. He began treating patients there 
and has become a respected member of the community. He has 
published a number of articles in The Journal of American 
Academy of Pediatric. Dr. Rahmajani is Board Certified as a 
specialist in pediatrics by the American Academy of 
Pediatricians.) 
Mrs. Williams became pregnant in July of 1982, and it 
was expected that she would deliver on April 15, 1983. Her 
obstetrician was Dr. James. Carol Ann had talked to Dr. 
Morris (Rahmajani) while she was pregnant about his taking 
care of her baby following birth. 
67 
Dr. Morris (Rahmajani) 
agreed. In the seventh month of her pregnancy, when the 
baby was only 29 weeks old, Carol Ann was involved in a 
minor car accident and went into labor. A few hours later, 
Lisa was born. 
The issues in this case are about the care and the 
treatment of Lisa after delivery. When Lisa was born, she 
weighed only 2 lbs. Dr. Morris (Rahmajani) will take the· 
stand and he will testify to the condition of this baby when 
it was born. He will tell you that shortly prior to birth, 
he was contacted at home by Dr. James regarding Mrs. 
Williams' condition. At this time, Dr. Morris (Rahmajani) 
instructed Dr. James to have the nurse place Mrs. Williams 
on an electronic fetal heart monitoring device to check the 
status of the baby. He then left for the hospital. When 
Dr. Morris (Rahmajani) arrived at the hospital at 1:15 p.m., 
he discovered that the baby was in fetal distress. A short 
time later, the baby was delivered by cesarean section. The 
delivery took forty-five minutes. 
When Lisa was born, she was experiencing a syndrome 
known as Hyaline Membrane Disease (HMO), otherwise known as 
respiratory distress syndrome or asphyxia. This syndrome 
accounts for 10% of all deaths in premature infants, and 
remains the number one cause of death in newborns. However, 
because of the actions of Dr. Morris (Rahmajani), Lisa's 
life was saved. 
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Upon birth, Lisa was suffering from asphyxia. The term 
"asphyxia" refers to depressed respiration, and means that 
she was having difficulty breathing. However, Lisa had only 
moderate asphyxia--a condition that is frequently seen in 
small, preterm infants, and Dr. Morris (Rahmajani) gave 
oxygen to Lisa to help her breathe. The decision to provide 
oxygen is made based on, among other factors, what is called 
the Apgar score. The Apgar score is a measure of the baby's 
condition upon birth. The evidence will show that the 
act1ons of Dr. Morris (Rahmajani) following Lisa's delivery 
were warranted given Lisa's Apgar score. The evidence will 
also show that, based on this Apgar score, Dr. Morris 
(Rahmajani) correctly choose to provide supplemental oxygen 
by the bag and mask method as opposed to the method called 
intubation. Intubation was an unnecessary risk that Or. 
Morris (Rahmajani) choose not to take--it can cause 
infection and other damage. Dr. Morris (Rahmajani) will 
tell you that the correct method for providing supplemental 
oxygen therefore, was through an oxygen bag and mask, just 
as he did, rather than through intubation. 
The emergency passed, and .when the baby was breathing 
better, she was placed in an incubator to make sure that her 
progress would continue. Dr. Morris (Rahmajani) will 
explain to you that he was careful not to supply too much 
oxygen since, if he did, the baby would have been at risk of 
developing retrolental fibroplasia (RLF). RLF is a disease 
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that causes blindness in babies. You will hear a good deal 
of testimony about RLF, not 
(Rahmajani), but from a doctor 
courtroom to testify on behalf of 
This doctor's name is Dr. Edwards. 
only from Dr. Morris 
that will come into this 
Dr. Morris (Rahmajani). 
Dr. Edwards will explain to you that the disease known 
as RLF is the largest single cause of blindness in this 
country. He will explain to you that it is high levels of 
oxygen following birth that typically cause RLF. He will 
also explain to you that preterm small infants who develop 
respiratory distress, infants just like Lisa, are the most 
likely candidates to receive high levels of oxygen to 
maintain life until the respiratory distress emergency has 
tell you that during this period 
important that the administration of 
does not lead to what is known as 
passed. He will 
therefore, 
supplemental 
it is 
oxygen 
hyperoxia--too much oxygen which causes RLF. 
You will hear testimony from Dr. Edwards that despite 
all of the studies, and despite all of the advances in 
modern medicine, the precise levels of oxygen that can be 
supplied without causing RLF are unknown. He will tell you 
however, that it is believed that a baby will not develop 
RLF when given supplemental oxygen at levels below 40%. 
Here, Dr. Morris (Rahmajani) ordered that 30% oxygen be 
delivered. 
For whatever tragic reason, this child developed brain 
70 
damage. There are 850,000 children in this country with 
mental retardation and another 750,000 young people with 
cerebral palsy. Unfortunately, modern medicine still knows 
very little about the factors that cause these dreaded 
disabling conditions. Yet, you have heard Mr. Martin 
suggest that it was the improper treatment of Lisa's 
respiratory problem or asphyxia following birth that caused 
her injuries. However, as indicated by Lisa's Apgar score, 
Dr. Morris (Rahmajani) did provide proper treatment. 
In this case, the plaintiff, Carol Ann Williams, must 
prove that Dr. Morris (Rahmajani) was negligent in treating 
Lisa, and that it was the negligent actions of Dr. Morris 
(Rahmajani) that caused Lisa's retardation. Accordingly, I 
ask you to keep an open mind until you have heard all of the 
evidence. The plaintiff's case will be presented first. 
That is because the plaintiff has the burden of proving her 
claims of negligence against Dr. Morris (Rahmajani). The 
defendant is not required to put on any evidence because it 
is the plaintiff that must sustain her burden of proof. I 
have indicted to you that I expect to call certain witnesses 
to testify so that you have a complete understanding of the 
complex and the difficult decisions that Or. Morris 
(Rahmajani) needed to make in this case. I think when all 
the evidence is in, you will agree that there was no 
negligence on the part of Dr. Morris (Rahmajani), and 
accordingly, I will return, following my closing argument, 
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and ask you for a verdict of not guilty in his favor. Thank 
you very much for your attention. 
SUMMARY OF THE DIRECT EXAMINATION OF 
PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT DR. LOUIS MICHAELSON 
I was born in Chicago and attended medical school at the 
University of Illinois. I then did my internship and 
residency in pediatrics at Massachusetts General Hospital. 
I have been practicing as a pediatrician since 1959. I am 
Board Certified in pediatrics. I am now a member of the 
staff at Rush Presbyterian St. Luke's Medical Center. 
At the request of Mrs. Williams' attorney, I examined 
the medical records of this case, and I also examined Lisa. 
What I learned was that Mrs. Williams was pregnant with her 
first child at the age of 35. The expected date of delivery 
was April 15, 1983. However, after seven months of 
pregnancy, when the fetus was 29 weeks old, she experienced 
a preterm rupture of the membranes following a minor 
automobile accident. 
In this case, shortly after Mrs. Williams was admitted 
to the hospital, the nurse on duty noticed the passage of 
meconium from the amniotic fluid. This is typically a sign 
of a fetus in trouble or fetal distress. Meconium is 
essentially a fetal bowel movement that is emitted from the 
fetus when it is in distress or unable to obtain the 
requiste amount of oxygen. The presence of meconium 
indicates that the infant may require special care on 
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delivery. The passage of meconium therefore, should have 
indicated to Dr. Morris (Rahmajani) that special care was 
required, and that he could expect to see an infant that 
would be in distress upon delivery. 
Mrs. Williams was placed on an electronic fetal heart 
monitor. This is used to indicate fetal distress by 
comparing the fetal heart rate with the mother's uterine 
contractions during labor. If the fetal heart beat trails 
the uterine contractions, a syndrome known as late 
deceleration occurs, and indicates that the infant may be 
experiencing respiratory problems upon birth. Here, late 
decelerations were present. 
When a baby is born, the physician will assign it a 
numerical value that expresses the condition of the infant 
at periods of one minute and five minutes following birth. 
This numerical expression is known as the Apgar score and 
ranges from a low of O to a high of 10. The Apgar score is 
divided into five categories including heart rate, 
respiratory effort, muscle tone, reflex irritability, and 
color. Each category is rated between O and 2. A total one 
minute Apgar score of O to 3 indicates a respiratory 
problem called severe asphyxia. Asphyxia is typically 
attributable to a lack of oxygen in the lungs of the baby 
during labor and delivery. Moderate asphyxia is reflected 
by an Apgar score between 4 and 7, and indicates that the 
infant is breathing although it is pale and gasping. A 
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normal infant, with an Apgar score of 8 to 10, will cough or 
cry within seconds of delivery, and no further procedures 
are necessary. Here, the records claim to show that Lisa 
had an Apgar score of 4--at the bottom end of moderate 
asphyxia. 
With an infant in respiratory distress, an endotracheal 
tube should be inserted between the baby's vocal cords, and 
the lungs should be inflated with oxygen through the tube 
approximately 30 times per minute until the heart rate is at 
least 100 beats per minute. When an infant is suffering 
from respiratory distress syndrome or, as it is otherwise 
called, Hyaline Membrane Disease (HMO), intubation should be 
done. 
The HMO syndrome is essentially caused by an 
insufficient production of surfactant which is the material 
that is used to develop the fetal lungs during pregnancy. 
If the infant is born premature, it may not have yet 
produced the requisite amount of surfactant for full 
development of lungs. Thus, when the premature infant is 
born, the doctor should place the endotraceal tube into the 
baby's lungs to help it breathe. 
It is my opinion that Dr. Morris (Rahmajani) was 
negligent in this case for a number of reasons. First, once 
the baby was delivered, there was an improper delay in the 
The infant should have 
the one minute Apgar 
initial administration of oxygen. 
been given oxygen immediately after 
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score was taken. Instead, the medical records appear to 
reveal that there was at least a five minute delay between 
the time of delivery and the time that the oxygen was first 
delivered by bag and mask. Also, given the condition of the 
infant, Dr. Morris (Rahmajani) should have intubated the 
baby to fill its lungs with oxygen rather than provide 
oxygen by bag and mask. Had this been done immediately in 
this case, the baby's heart rate would not have dropped. 
This delay was a deviation from the standard of care, and I 
believe that this delay caused insult to the baby's brain. 
Once the baby was removed to the incubator, special care 
had to be taken to ensure that the proper levels of oxygen 
were given. Dr. Morris (Rahmajani) ordered that the baby be 
placed in the incubator with 30% oxygen. This level was 
insufficient, even if we assume that this level was 
maintained consistently. In the present case, we do not 
know whether Lisa was receiving a consistent supply of 
oxygen because Dr. Morris (Rahmajani) never conducted blood 
gas studies. Blood gas studies analyze the exact amount of 
oxygen in the blood at any given time. They were not taken 
and no laboratory results were 
oxygen level in Lisa's blood 
already insufficient level of 30%. 
recorded. As such, the 
may have dropped below the 
Even if we assume that a 30% oxygen level was maintained 
consistently throughout this period, this level of oxygen is 
grossly insufficient. It is evident that the baby does have 
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brain damage, and the insufficiency of oxygen following 
birth is the likely cause. The failure to provide proper 
oxygen levels, and the failure to perform blood gas studies 
were unacceptable deviations from the standard of care. 
Furthermore, it was a deviation from the standard of 
care for Dr. Morris (Rahmajani) to fail to transfer this 
baby. Because of the prematurity and the evidence of fetal 
distress prior to delivery, Dr. Morris (Rahmajani) should 
have been placed on notice of a high risk infant. Under 
these circumstances, he should have required the transfer of 
Mrs. Williams to one of the neonatal centers in Chicago 
prior to delivery or even during the months following birth. 
Dr. Morris (Rahmajani) is on staff at Northwestern Memorial 
Hospital which was available for transfer. With an infant 
in fetal distress, it must have access to neonatal intensive 
care at all times. Dr. Morris (Rahmajani) failed to do this 
and was negligent in failing to do so. Any one of these 
factors was a deviation from acceptable medical practice, 
and was sufficient to cause Lisa's injuries. 
SUMMARY OF THE DIRECT 
EXAMINATION OF DR. RAYMOND EDWARDS 
My name is Raymond Edwards, and I am a physician. I 
have been asked to testify as an expert in this case on 
behalf of Dr. Morris (Rahmajani). I was born in Chicago, 
Illinois and attended medical school at the Johns Hopkins 
University, where I did my general rotating internship. 
76 
Thereafter, I did a residency in pediatrics at New York 
Hospital. I am Board Certified in Pediatrics. I am now a 
member of the staff at Children's Memorial Hospital. 
In connection with my opinions in this case, I reviewed 
the medical records of Dr. James relating to the pregnancy 
of Mrs. Williams. I have reviewed the hospital chart from 
Winston Community Hospital relating to the delivery that was 
performed by Dr. James, and the care following delivery by 
Dr. Morris (Rahmajani). In providing my opinions in this 
case, I also relied upon the several articles that I have 
published in this area. These articles have appeared in 
various journals, among which include, The Journal of 
Pediatrics. 
I have two major opinions in this case. First, that Dr. 
Morris (Rahmajani) did not deviate from the standard of care 
acceptable of a practicing pediatrician in his treatment of 
Lisa Williams. Second, that the brain damage that the baby 
suffered was not caused by anything that Dr. Morris 
(Rahmajani) did or failed to do. 
I believe it is impossible in this case to say, with any 
certainty, what caused the brain damage in this child. A 
low level of oxygen is but one of several factors routinely 
suggested by physicians as causing brain damage. Therefore, 
in most brain damage cases, physicians will, as a matter of 
routine, look for evidence of anoxia or asphyxia. Recall 
these are two respiratory conditions brought about by low 
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levels of oxygen. Thus, where a child has both brain 
damage, and it is recorded in the medical records that the 
child was suffering from some asphyxia, it is frequently 
assumed that the asphyxia and hence, the low oxygen level, 
caused the brain damage. 
However, even when we know, for example, that one factor 
such as, a low oxygen level, can cause brain damage, we 
cannot be certain in most cases that the low level of oxygen 
did, in fact, cause such damage. In order to say that a 
specific factor caused a specific injury to occur, 
physicians must look at all the potential causes of that 
specific injury, and systematically eliminate each cause 
until only one remains. 
However, in infants with mental retardation or cerebral 
palsy, this method often fails to provide a definitive 
explanation of cause because we do not know what are all the 
causes of brain damage. 
a simplistic form of 
As such, doctors frequently rely on 
reasoning to determine the cause of 
I believe that this is what Dr. 
the plaintiffs in providing his 
brain damage in infants. 
Michealson has done for 
opinion that the brain damage was caused by a lack of oxygen 
following delivery. However, in this case, Dr. Michealson 
cannot say that a lack of oxygen following birth caused 
brain damage. 
Let's review what happened. The hospital chart revealed 
that this baby had a one minute Apgar score of 4. This 
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indicates moderate asphyxia; an infant who is breathing 
although pale and gasping. In Dr. Michealson's opinion, 
since Lisa's Apgar score indicated asphyxia, although 
moderate, that meant that the baby must have had an 
insufficiency of oxygen. Since the baby ended up with brain 
damage, the insufficiency of oxygen must have caused the 
brain damage. I don't believe that this necessarily 
follows. If this were true, then how could we explain 
babies that have a minute Apgar score of O or severe 
asphyxia that develop with no brain damage or mental 
handicap. A well known study of infants with Apgar scores 
of O found that 93% of these babies had no serious 
neurological or mental handicap later in life. Conversely, 
another study of over 55,000 pregnant women found that 73% 
of the children who later developed cerebral palsy had Apgar 
scores of 7-10 at five minutes. When we start to look at 
these studies, Dr. Michealson's evidence via his simplistic 
reasoning begins to fall apart. Thus, it is extremely 
difficult, in any given case to determine whether a factor 
such as, asphyxia, is the cause of brain damage or whether 
it is merely the symptom of another problem. So, first I do 
not believe that anyone in this case can state with a 
reasonable degree of certainty that it is more true than not 
true that Lisa's brain damage was triggered by any 
particular event. 
Second, with respect to the care rendered by Dr. Morris 
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(Rahmajani), it is my opinion that his care was within 
acceptable limits. Dr. Michealson has said that Dr. Morris 
(Rahmajani) deviated from the standard of care. I disagree. 
Or. Morris (Rahmajani) was confronted with a baby that was 
two months preterm and weighed only 2 lbs. The size of this 
baby is so small that the doctor could hold it in one hand. 
When it was born, and showed that it had problems breathing, 
Dr. Morris (Rahmajani) immediately provided it with oxygen 
to help the baby breathe. 
In terms of the correct method for administering oxygen, 
the decision of whether or not to intubate a baby depends on 
the doctor's clinical judgment, and I believe that Dr. 
Morris (Rahmajani) appropriately exercised his judgment 
here. As stated, intubation would only be appropriate in 
the case of severe asphyxia, and not in the case of moderate 
asphyxia. The risks of intubation include infection and 
other damage--sspecially when you are dealing with such a 
small infant. 
Once the baby had started breathing more efficiently, he 
discontinued the oxygen, and had the baby placed in an 
incubator. Once the baby was placed in the nursery, he 
again used his clinical judgment to determine the proper 
level of oxygen to be provided. The level of oxygen that he 
decided to administer was 30%. This was the level that all 
of the pediatricians at Winston Hospital were administering 
at this time. 
Dr. Morris (Rahmajani) 
administer oxygen at levels in 
studies have indicated that 
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was also careful not to 
excess of 40%. Recent 
the administration of 
supplemental oxygen in excess of 40% can cause blindness in 
babies. This disease essentially occurs when too much 
oxygen is given to children and ultimately burns the 
arteries in the baby's retina causing blindness. 
Retrolental fibroplasia (RLF) is the largest single cause of 
blindness in children in this country. 
This disorder was first recognized by doctors in 1941. 
As a relationship between the administration of too much 
oxygen to preterm babies and RLF became apparent, the 
incidence of RLF dropped off dramatically. Unfortunately, 
however, the alternative practice of administering lower 
levels of oxygen, in order to prevent RLF, began to be 
associated with an increase in death among premature 
infants--especially those with respiratory distress 
syndrome. In response, doctors, again, began giving higher 
levels of oxygen. However, as doctors were raising oxygen 
levels in an effort to prevent death, the number of blind 
babies that were born with RLF began to increase. We are 
still conducting numerous studies in this area. Recently, 
however, The American Academy of Pediatrics has suggested 
that the administration of supplemental oxygen at levels of 
40% is considered to be safe. In this case, despite the 
other tragic consequence, it is apparent that Dr. Morris 
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(Rahmajani) prevented RLF from developing since Lisa has 
normal vision. 
There is no question that it is a difficult choice for a 
pediatrician to determine what level of oxygen should be 
supplied. Although I agree that blood gas studies are a 
more accurate and reliable indicator of the particular level 
of oxygen in a baby's blood, because these tests are taken 
by pricking the skin on the bottom of the infant's foot, 
such tests can be detrimental to the baby's health--they 
also can lead to infection and disease. In this instance, 
the person who is best suited to tell us what level was 
required is Dr. Morris (Rahmajani). He is an exceptionally 
well qualified pediatrician. We must allow doctors to 
exercise their clinical judgment since their examination of 
the baby is the best indicator of how much oxygen is 
required. 
With regard to Dr. Michealson's claim that the baby 
should have been transfered, I believe that proper care was 
rendered at Winston Community Hospital. This would obviate 
the need for transfer to a special center in Chicago. 
Furthermore, in this case, a quick delivery was indicated, 
and with any transfer, a potential is raised for additional 
complications. 
It is in my opinion that Dr. Morris (Rahmajani) 
exercised good judgment in caring for Lisa. I believe he 
did what should have been done, and that the tragic 
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condition that this little girl ultimately ended up with was 
not caused by Or. Morris (Rahmajani). 
II. Text of the Complex Legal Summary 
IN THE CIRCUIT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS 
COUNTY DEPARTMENT, LAW DIVISION 
CAROL ANN WILLIAMS, as mother ) 
and next friend of LISA WILLIAMS,) 
a minor, ) 
v. 
Plaintiff, 
JAMES MORRIS, M.D., 
(DENISH RAHMAJANI, M.D.,) 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
No.: 85 L 12397 
SUMMARY OF THE TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
OPENING REMARKS BY JUDGE MEYERS 
Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury: the first step in the 
proceedings was what was known as voir dire. This is the 
period during which the attorneys had an opportunity to ask 
questions of the jurors regarding your ability to hear this 
case. After questioning more than 65 potential jurors, you 
twelve jurors and two altenatives were empanelled to hear 
the evidence in this case. This is a medical malpractice 
action brought by Carol Ann Williams, on behalf of her 
daughter, Lisa Williams, against Dr. James Morris (Dr. 
83 
84 
Denish Rahmajani). The attorneys for both parties now have 
an opportunity to provide you with their opening statements. 
The opening statement is designed to give you an idea of 
what the case is all about and what the evidence is expected 
to show. Mr. Martin, the attorney for Mrs. Williams, will 
address you first. 
OPENING STATEMENT BY COUNSEL 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF, THOMAS C. MARTIN 
Ladies and gentlemen, as Judge Meyers told you this is a 
medical negligence action that has been brought on behalf of 
my client, Carol Ann Williams, against Dr. James Morris (Dr. 
Denish Rahmajani), for injuries to Mrs. Williams' daughter, 
Lisa, following the delivery of the little girl on February 
20, 1983. The evidence in this case will show that the 
actions of Dr. Morris (Dr. Denish Rahmanjani) following the 
delivery of Lisa, left her hopelessly and irreversibly brain 
damaged. The evidence will also show that Dr. Morris' (Dr. 
Rahmanjani's) actions were deviations from the standard of 
care of doctors in the community. 
My client, Carol Ann Williams, at age 35, was pregnant 
with her first child. During the course of her pregnancy, 
Mrs. Williams was under the care of Dr. James, her 
obstetrician. Her expected date of delivery was April 15, 
1983. On February 20, 1983, however, just following her 
seventh month of pregnancy, Mrs. Williams was involved in a 
minor automobile accident and experienced a preterm rupture 
of membranes. 
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She drove herself to Winston Community 
Hospital in Winston, Illinois, where she was admitted to the 
labor room. She had already begun to have Gontractions. 
Several hours later, the nurse on duty in the labor and 
delivery room detected a passage of meconium in the amniotic 
fluid and called Dr. James, Mrs. Williams' obstetrician, on 
the telephone. The expulsion of meconium indicated fetal 
distress. Or. James called the defendant, Dr. James Morris 
(Dr. Denish Rahmajani), a pediatrician with whom Mrs. 
Williams had made arrangements to care for her child 
following birth. Dr. Morris (Dr. Rahmajani) told Dr. James 
to have the nurse place Mrs. Williams on an electronic fetal 
heart monitor, which was done. However, Dr Morris (Dr. 
Rahmajani) did not arrive at the hospital until 
approximately 1:15 p.m.--two hours later. When he arrived, 
Dr. Morris (Dr. Rahmajani) examined Carol Ann. His clinical 
examination of the baby and his examination of the print-out 
strip from the fetal heart monitor confirmed that the baby 
was in distress. Forty-five 
delivered by cesarean section. 
minutes later, Lisa was 
Upon birth, Lisa weighed 2 
kilograms, and was having irregular, shallow and gasping 
respirations. Lisa was then turned over to Dr. Morris (Dr. 
Rahmanjani) who was in the delivery room. Dr. Morris (Dr. 
Rahmajani) and his nurse attempted to suction the baby, and 
began oxygenating Lisa by bag and mask. They ventilated the 
infant for five minutes. At no time was tracheal intubation 
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used as a means of oxygenation. 
A short time later, Dr. Morris (Dr. Rahmajani) 
discontinued the oxygen and had Lisa taken to the nursery. 
As you will hear later, Dr. Morris (Dr. Rahmajani) claims 
that he instructed the nursing staff to carry out his 
routine orders. Those orders included placing Lisa in a 
heated isolette, and most importantly, to supply inspired 
air at a concentration of only 30%. However, as· the 
evidence will show, the 30% concentration given to Lisa was 
too low to prevent neurologic damage. 
Lisa remained in the nursery for two months. For the 
first three weeks, Or. Morris (Dr Rahmajani) continued to 
oxygenate Lisa at a concentration of 30%. Throughout this 
time, he claims to have visited Lisa three times a day. 
On March 15, 1983, Dr. Morris (DR .. Rahmajani) went on 
vacation for three weeks. He asked his associate, Dr. 
Patel, to follow Lisa. Before leaving, Dr. Morris (Dr. 
Rahmajani) decreased the concentration to 25%. Five days 
later, Lisa was noted as making shallow breath sounds and 
periodic grunting. Dr. Patel increased the oxygen level to 
30% where it stayed for two weeks. When Dr. Morris (Dr. 
Rahmajani) returned from vacation, he decided that Lisa 
could be discharged. 
Once Lisa was home 
problems. Carol Ann 
developing as a normal 
however, her mother began to notice 
first noticed that her baby was not 
infant should have developed. She 
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began to notice that the baby was not able to control her 
hand, head, and arm movements, and was not able to hold on 
to toys and bottles with her hands. She also noticed that 
Lisa was crying out at various times throughout the day and 
night for no apparent reason. Her mother became worried and 
concerned. Lisa was taken back to the hospital on May 26, 
1983, for an outpatient visit. It was on this visit that 
Dr. Morris (Dr. Rahmajani) first determined that the baby 
was suffering from neurologic damage. 
Today, Lisa is three years and six months old. She has 
no awareness of who she is. Although she has grown in 
height and weight at a relatively normal rate, she is not 
able to walk, and she is not able to reach, climb, or hold 
on to any objects. She has to be diapered, and she is 
totally dependent upon her parents and nurses for her care. 
She is going to require a lifetime of care by her parents, 
nurses, rehabilitation specialists, and family members. 
This lawsuit has been brought against Dr. Morris (Dr. 
Rahmajani) for causing Lisa's injuries. You will hear 
expert medical testimony from Dr. Michaelson, an 
exceptionally well qualified pediatrician, who will explain 
to you that Dr. Morris (Dr. Rahmajani) was negligent in his 
care of Lisa. Dr. Michaelson will tell you that since Lisa 
was born premature, 
extrauterine life. Dr. 
Morris (Dr. Rahmajani) 
her lungs were unable to adjust to 
Michaelson will explain that Dr. 
should have anticipated that Lisa 
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would be in dist~ess upon delivery, and therefore, should 
have been prepared for an emergency situation. 
Immediately upon birth, Dr. Morris (Dr. Rahmajani) 
should have resuscitated Lisa through endotracheal 
intubation. As the evidence will show however, there was a 
five minute delay before Dr. Morris (Dr. Rahmajani) 
initiated ventilitory measures, and he ventilated the infant 
by .bag and mask. 
Dr. Michaelson will also tell you that after delivery, 
Dr. Morris (Dr. Rahmajani) should have maintained 
consistently a proper concentration of oxygen. The evidence 
in this case will show that following delivery, the 30% 
oxygen concentration in Lisa's blood was improper, and 
therefore, caused her injuries. 
We will show that once Lisa was placed in the isolette, 
Dr. Morris (Dr. Rahmajani) was negligent in relying 
exclusively upon his clinical judgment in attempting to 
determine whether Lisa was receiving stable concentrations 
of oxygen. Dr. Morris (Dr. Rahmajani) should have conducted 
aterial blood gases. Determination of aterial blood gases 
would have provided more accurate and reliable information 
about whether Lisa was receiving sufficient concentrations 
of oxygen. These were not done. 
F i n a 11 y , Dr . Morr i s ( Dr . 
failing to transfer Lisa to a 
Rahmajani) was negligent in 
hospital with a new born 
intensive care unit. Winston Community Hospital does not 
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have such facilities but Dr. Morris (Dr. Rahmajani) knew 
that Northwestern Memorial Hospital did, and therefore, 
knowing the potential for problems, he should have ordered a 
transfer. 
In this case, Lisa's neurologic damage was caused by the 
negligence of Dr. Morris (Dr. Rahmajani). We will show how 
this occurred through the testimony of the witnesses. At 
the close of all the evidence, you will be asked to render a 
verdict in favor of Carol Ann and Lisa Williams, and against 
the defendant, Dr. James Morris (Dr. Rahmajani). Thank you 
very much for your attention. 
OPENNING STATEMENT BY 
MR. MONTGOMERY, COUNSEL FOR DR. MORRIS (DR. RAHMAJANI) 
Ladies and gentlemen, my name is Bill Montgomery, and I 
represent Dr. Morris (Dr. Rahmajani). What this case is 
about is whether this little baby's condition was caused by 
the malpractice of my client, Dr. James Morris (Dr. 
Rahmajani). What the evidence will really show in this case 
is that Dr. Morris (Dr. Rahmajani) was confronted with an 
emergency situation with a little baby that weighed less 
than two kilograms, and that his efforts saved Lisa's life. 
Dr. Morris (Dr. Rahmajani) is a pediatrician practicing 
in Winston, Illinois. He has been practicing there, 
treating babies, for 10 years. He attended medical school 
at Stanford University, and came to Winston following an 
internship and residency at Northwestern Memorial Hospital. 
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He has become a respected member of the community. He has 
published a number of articles in The Journal of The 
American Academy of Pediatrics. Dr. Morris (Dr. Rahmajani) 
is Board Certified as a specialist in pediatrics by the 
American Academy of Pediatricians. 
Mrs. Williams became pregnant in July of 1982, and it 
was expected that she would deliver on April 15, 1983. Her 
obstetrician was Dr. James. Carol Ann had talked to Dr. 
Morris (Dr. Rahmajani) while she was pregnant about his 
taking care of her baby following birth. Dr. Morris (Dr. 
Rahmajani) agreed. In the seventh month of her pregnancy, 
when the baby was only 29 weeks old, Carol Ann was involved 
in a minor car accident, and experienced a preterm rupture 
of membranes. A few hours later, Lisa was born. 
The issues in this case are about the care and the 
treatment of Lisa after delivery. When Lisa was born, she 
weighed only 2 kilograms. Dr. Morris (Dr. Rahmajani) will 
take the stand and he will testify to the condition of this 
baby when it was born. He will tell you that shortly prior 
to birth, he was contacted at home by Dr. James regarding 
Mrs. Williams' condition. At this time, Dr. Morris (Dr. 
Rahmajani) instructed Dr. James to have the nurse place Mrs. 
Williams on an electronic fetal heart monitor to check the 
status of the baby. He then left for the hospital. When 
Dr. Morris (Dr. Rahmajani) arrived at the hospital at 1:15 
p.m., he discovered that the baby was in fetal distress. A 
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short time later, the baby was delivered by cesarean 
section. The delivery took forty-five minutes. 
When Lisa was born, she was experiencing Hyaline 
Membrane Disease (HMO) or Respiratory Distress Syndrome 
(RDS). This syndrome accounts for 10% of all deaths in 
premature infants, and remains the number one cause of death 
in newborns. However, because of the actions of Dr. Morris 
(Dr. Rahmajani), Lisa's life was saved. 
Upon birth, Lisa was suffering from neonatal asphyxia. 
However, Lisa had only moderate asphyxia--a condition that 
is frequently seen in small, preterm infants, and Dr. Morris 
(Dr. Rahmajani) oxygenated Lisa. The decision to oxygenate 
is made based on, among other factors, what is called the 
Apgar score. The evidence will show that the actions of Dr. 
Morris (Dr. Rahmajani) following Lisa's delivery were 
warranted given Lisa's Apgar score. The evidence will also 
show that, based on this Apgar score, Dr. Morris (Dr. 
Rahmajani) correctly choose to provide ventilatory therapy 
by bag and mask. Mechanical ventilation was an unnecessary 
risk that Dr. Morris (Dr. Rahmajani) choose not to take--it 
can lead to sepis. Dr. Morris (Dr. Rahmajani) will tell you 
that the correct method for oxygenation therefore, was 
through bag and mask. 
The emergency passed, and when the baby was breathing 
better, she was placed in an isolette to make sure that her 
progress would continue. Dr. Morris (Dr. Rahmajani) will 
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explain to you that he was careful not to over oxygenate 
Lisa since, if he did, she would have been at risk of 
developing retrolental fibroplasia (RLF). RLF is a disease 
that causes blindness in infants. You will hear a good deal 
of testimony about RLF, not only from Dr. Morris (Dr. 
Rahmaj an i ) , but from a doctor that wi 11 come into this 
courtroom to testify on behalf of Dr. Morris (Dr. 
Rahmaj an i ) . This doctor's name is Dr. Edwards. 
Dr. Edwards will explain to you that the disease known 
as RLF is the largest single cause of blindness in this 
country. He will explain to you that it is h; gh 
concentrations of oxygen following birth that typically 
cause RLF. He will also explain to you that preterm small 
infants who develop respiratory distress, infants just like 
Lisa, are the most likely candidates to receive high 
concentrations of oxygen to maintain life until the 
respiratory distress emergency has passed. He will tell you 
that during this period therefore, it is important that the 
administration of additional fractional inspired air does 
not result in oxygen toxicity which causes RLF. 
You will hear testimony from Dr. Edwards that despite 
all of the studies, and despite all of the advances in 
modern medicine, the precise concentrations of inspired 
oxygen that can be supplied without causing RLF are unknown. 
He will tell you however, that it is believed that a baby 
will not develop RLF when given additional fractional 
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inspired oxygen at concentrations below 40%. Here, Dr. 
Morris (Dr. Rahmajani) ordered that 30% be delivered. 
For whatever tragic reason, this child developed 
neurologic damage. There are 850,000 children in this 
country with mental retardation and another 750,000 young 
people with cerebral palsy. Unfortunately, modern medicine 
still knows very little about the factors that cause these 
dreaded disabling conditions. Yet, you have heard Mr. 
Martin suggest that it was the improper treatment of Lisa's 
asphyxia following birth that caused her injuries. However, 
as indicated by Lisa's Apgar score, Dr. Morris (Dr. 
Rahmajani) did provide proper treatment. 
In this case, the plaintiff, Carol 
prove that Dr. Morris (Dr. Rahmajani) 
Ann Williams, must 
was negligent in 
treating Lisa, and that it was the negligent actions of Dr. 
Morris (Dr. Ramajani) that caused Lisa's retardation. 
Accordingly, I ask you to keep an open mind until you have 
heard all of the evidence. The plaintiff's case will be 
presented first. That is because the plaintiff has the 
burden of proving her claims of negligence against Dr. 
Morris (Dr. Rahmajani). The defendant is not required to 
put on any evidence because it is the plaintiff that must 
sustain her burden of proof. I have indicted to you that I 
expect to call certain witnesses to testify so that you have 
a complete understanding of the complex and the difficult 
decisions that Dr. Morris (Dr. Rahmajani) needed to make in 
this case. 
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I think when all the evidence is in, you will 
agree that there was no negligence on the part of Dr. Morris 
(DR. Rahmajani), and accordingly, I will return, following 
my closing argument, and ask you for a verdict of not guilty 
in his favor. Thank you very much for your attention. 
SUMMARY OF THE DIRECT EXAMINATION OF 
PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT DR. LOUIS MICHAELSON 
I was born in Chicago and attended medical school at the 
University of Illinois. I then did my internship and 
residency in pediatrics at Massachusetts General Hospital. 
I have been practicing as a pediatrician since 1959. I am 
Board Certified in pediatrics. I am now a member of the 
staff at Rush Presbyterian St. Luke's Medical Center. 
At the request of Mrs. Williams' attorney, I examined 
the medical records of this case, and I also examined Lisa. 
What I learned was that Mrs. Williams was pregnant with her 
first child at the age of 35. The expected date of delivery 
was April 15, 1983. However, after seven months of 
pregnancy, when the fetus was 29 weeks old, she experienced 
a preterm rupture of membranes following a minor automobile 
accident. 
In this case, shortly after Mrs. Williams was admitted 
to the hospital, the nurse on duty noticed the expulsion of 
meconium from the amniotic fluid. Meconium is essentially a 
fetal bowel movement that is emitted from the fetus when it 
is in distress or unable to obtain the requiste amount of 
oxygen. The expulsion 
indicated to Dr. Morris 
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of meconium therefore, should have 
(Dr. Rahmajani) that special care 
was required, and that he could expect to see a neonate in 
distress upon delivery. 
Mrs. Williams was placed on an electronic fetal heart 
monitor. This is used to indicate fetal distress by 
comparing the fetal heart rate with the mother's uterine 
contractions during labor. Fetal heart rate is evaluated by 
assessing both baseline and periodic changes. If the fetal 
heart beat trails the uterine contractions, late 
decelerations occur. Late decelerations are due to 
uteroplacental insufficiency as the result of decreased 
blood flow and oxygen transfer to the fetus through 
intervillous 
hypoxemia. 
space 
When 
during uterine 
uteroplacental 
fetal distress may ensue. Here, 
present. 
contractions causing 
insufficiency is acute, 
late decelerations were 
When a baby is born, the physician will assign it a 
numerical value that expresses the condition of the infant 
at periods of one minute and five minutes following birth. 
This numerical expression is known as the Apgar score and 
ranges from a low of O to a high of 10. The Apgar score is 
divided into five categories including heart rate, 
respiratory effort, muscle tone, reflex irritability, and 
color. Each category is rated between o and 2. A total one 
minute Apgar score of O to 3 indicates severe asphyxia. An 
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Apgar score between 4 and 7 indicates moderate asphyxia; the 
infant is breathing although it is pale and gasping. A 
normal infant, with an Apgar score of 8 to 10, will cough or 
cry within seconds of delivery, and no further procedures 
are necessary. Here, the records claim to show that Lisa 
had an Apgar score of 4--at the bottom end of moderate 
asphyxia. 
Asphyxia is the impaired exchange of oxygen and carbon 
dioxide on a ventilatory basis. Asphyxia is typically 
attributed to an increase in arterial carbon dioxide tension 
causing a decrease of below normal levels of oxygen in blood 
and/or tissue. In short, circulatory patterns that 
accompany asphyxia represent an inability to make the 
transition to extrauterine circulation--in effect a return 
to fetal-like circulatory patterns. Failure of lung 
expansion and establishment of respiration rapidly produces 
hypoxia, acidosis, and hypercarbia. These biochemical 
changes result in pulmonary vasoconstriction, with retention 
of high pulmonary vascular resistance, hypoperfusion of the 
lungs, and a large right-to-left shunt through the ductus 
arteriosus. The foramen ovale opens, and blood flows from 
right to left. 
Although the neonate is supplied with protective 
mechanisms against hypoxial insults, severe prolonged 
hypoxia will overcome these protective mechanisms, resulting 
in brain damage. 
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Furthermore, asphyxia and prematurity are two main 
factors associated with RDS or HMO. Asphyxia, with a 
corresponding decrease in pulmonary blood flow, may 
interfere with surfactant production. At birth, the neonate 
synthesizes surfactant at an increased rate to adjust to an 
air-breathing existence. Development of RDS by the preterm 
infant indicates a failure to synthesize lecithin at the 
rate required to maintain alveolar stability. Alveolar 
instability upon expiration with increasing atelectasis 
causes hypoxia and acidosis, which inhibit the surfactant 
system and cause pulmonary vasoconstriction. Thus the 
central pathophysiologic defect, lung instability due to 
this abnormality in the surfactant system, precipitates the 
biochemical aberrations of hypoxemia, hypercarbia, and 
acidemia, which further increases pulmonary 
vasoconstriction and hypoperfusion. Adequate gaseous 
exchange dependent on diffusion and ventilation/perfusion 
ratio is upset with RDS. Hypoxia produces physiologic 
complications and consequences that increase the hypoxia and 
decrease pulmonary perfusion. 
When a neonate is suffering from asphyxia, respiratory 
therapy by mechanical ventilation is required immediately. 
The physician should put a laryngoscope into the right side 
of the infant's mouth to move the tongue from the 
respiratory tract. After the laryngoscope has been put into 
place, an endotracheal tube should be inserted between the 
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baby's vocal cords, and the lungs should be inflated with 
oxygen through the tube approximately 30 times per minute 
until the heart rate is at least 100 beats per minute. 
It is my opinion that Dr. Morris (Dr. Rahmajani) was 
negligent in this case for a number of reasons. First, once 
the baby was delivered, there was an improper delay in 
initial respiratory ventilation. The infant should have 
been oxygenated immediately after the one minute Apgar score 
was taken. Instead, the medical records appear to reveal 
that there was at least a five minute delay between the time 
of delivery and the time that resuscitation measures were 
first delivered. 
Dr. Morris (Dr. 
Also, given the condition of the infant, 
Rahmajani) should have intubated the 
neonate. Had this been done immediately in 
infant's heart rate would not have dropped. 
a deviation from the standard of care, and 
this delay caused insult to the baby's brain. 
this case, the 
This delay was 
I believe that 
Once the baby was removed to the isolette, special care 
had to be taken to ensure that an adequate and stable 
concentration of oxygen was supplied to prevent Pao2. Dr. 
Morris (Dr. Rahmajani) ordered that the baby be placed in 
the isolette with 30% oxygen. This concentration was 
inadequate, even if we assume that this concentration was 
maintained consistently. In the present case, we do not 
know whether Lisa was receiving a stable concentration of 
oxygen because Dr. Morris (Dr. Rahmajani) never conducted 
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aterial blood gases. Aterial blood gases determine the 
partial pressures of oxygen and carbon dioxide in the blood. 
They were not taken and no laboratory results were recorded. 
As such, the concentration of oxygen in Lisa's blood may 
have dropped below the already inadequate level of 30%. 
Even if we assume that a stable oxygen concentration of 
30% was maintained throughout this period, this 
concentration of oxygen is· grossly insufficient. It is 
evident that the baby does have neurologic damage, and 
inadequate respiratory oxygenation following birth is the 
likely cause. The failure to provide adequate fractional 
inspired oxygen, and the failure to perform blood gases were 
unacceptable deviations from the standard of care. 
Furthermore, it was a deviation from the standard of 
care for Dr. ·Morris (Dr. Rahmajani) to fail to transfer this 
baby. Because of the prematurity and the evidence of fetal 
distress prior to delivery, Dr. Morris (Dr. Rahmajani) 
should have been placed on notice of a high risk infant. 
Under these circumstances, he should have required the 
transfer of Mrs. Williams to one of the neonatal centers in 
Chicago prior to delivery or even during the months 
following birth. Dr. Morris (Dr. Rahmajani) is on staff at 
Northwestern Memorial Hospital which was available for 
transfer. With an .infant in fetal distress, it must have 
access to neonatal intensive care at all times. Dr. Morris 
(Or. Rahmajani) failed to do this and was negligent in 
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failing to do so. Any one of these factors was a deviation 
from acceptable medical practice, and was sufficient to 
cause Lisa's injuries. 
SUMMARY OF THE DIRECT 
EXAMINATION OF DR. RAYMOND EDWARDS 
My name is Raymond Edwards, and I am a physician. I 
have been asked to testify as an expert in this case on 
behalf of Dr. Morris (Dr. Rahmajani). I was born in 
Chicago, Illinois and attended medical school at the Johns 
Hopkins University, where I did my general rotating 
internship. Thereafter, I did a residency in pediatrics at 
New York Hospital. I am Board Certified in Pediatrics. I 
am now a member of the staff at Children's Memorial 
Hospital. 
In connection with my opinions in this case, I reviewed 
the medical records of Dr. James relating to the pregnancy 
of Mrs. Williams. I have reviewed the hospital chart from 
Winston Community Hospital relating to the delivery that was 
performed by Dr. James, and the care following delivery by 
Dr. Morris (Dr. Rahmajani). In providing my opinions in 
this case, I also relied upon the several articles that I 
have published in this area. These articles have appeared 
in various journals, among which include, The Journal of 
Pediatrics. 
I have two major opinions in this case. First, that Dr. 
Morris (Dr. Rahmajani) did not deviate from the standard of 
care acceptable of a 
treatment of Lisa Williams. 
practicing 
Second, 
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pediatrician in his 
that the neurologic 
damage that the neonate suffered was not caused by anything 
that Dr. Morris (Dr. Rahmajani) did or failed to do. 
I believe it is impossible in this case to say, with any 
certainty, what caused the neurologic damage in this child. 
Hypoxia is but one of several factors routinely suggested 
by physicians as causing neurologic damage. Therefore, in 
most brain damage cases, physicians will, as a matter of 
routine, look for evidence of hypoxia. Thus, where a child 
has both neurologic damage, and it is recorded in the 
medical records that the child was suffering from some 
neonatorum asphyxia, be it pallida or livida, it is 
frequently assumed that the hypoxia caused the dysfunction. 
However, even when we know, for example, that one factor 
such as, asphyxia, can cause brain damage, we cannot be 
certain in most cases that the asphyxia did, in fact, cause 
such damage. In order to say that a specific factor caused 
a specific dysfunction to occur, physicians must look at all 
the potential causes of that specific dysfunction, and 
systematically eliminate each cause until only one remains. 
However, in infants with mental retardation or cerebral 
palsy, this method often fails to provide a definitive 
explanation of cause because we do not know what are all the 
causes of brain damage in human infants. As such, doctors 
frequently rely on a syllogism to determine the cause of 
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neurologic damage. I believe that this is what Dr. 
Michaelson has done for the plaintiffs in providing his 
opinion that the dysfunction was caused by hypoxia following 
delivery. However, in this case, Dr. Michaelson cannot say 
definitively that an increase in aterial carbon dioxide 
tension following birth caused brain damage. 
Let's review what happened. The hospital chart revealed 
that this baby had a one minute Apgar score of 4. This 
indicates moderate asphyxia. In Dr. Michaelson's opinion, 
since Lisa's Apgar score indicated asphyxia, although 
moderate, that meant that the baby must have been hypoxic. 
Since the baby ended up with neurologic damage, the hypoxia 
must have caused anoxic brain damage. I don't believe that 
this necessarily follows. If this were true, then how could 
we explain babies that have a 1 minute Apgar score of O or 
severe asphyxia that develop with no neurologic damage or 
mental handicap. A well known study of infants with Apgar 
scores of O found that 93% of these babies had no serious 
neurologic or mental handicap later in life. Conversely, 
another study of over 55,000 pregnant women found that 73% 
of the children who later developed cerebral palsy had Apgar 
scores of 7-10 at five minutes. When we start to look at 
these studies, Dr. Michaelson's syllogism begins to fall 
apart. Thus, it is extremely difficult, in any given case 
to determine whether a factor such as, asphyxia, is the 
cause of neurologic damage or whether it is merely the 
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symptom of another problem. So, first I do not believe that 
anyone in this case can state with a reasonable degree of 
certainty that it is more true than not true that Lisa's 
neurologic damage was triggered by any particular event. 
Second, with respect to the care rendered by Dr. Morris 
(Dr. Rahmajani), it is my opinion that his care was within 
acceptable limits. Dr. Michaelson has said that Dr. Morris 
(Dr. Rahmajani) deviated from the standard of care. I 
disagree. Dr. Morris (Dr. Rahmajani) was confronted with a 
baby that was two months pre term and weighed only 2 
kilograms. The size of this baby is so smal 1 that the 
doctor could hold it in one hand. When it was born, and 
flaring nares and grunting, Dr. Morris (Dr. Rahmajani) 
immediately administered resuscitation therapy. 
In terms of the correct method for ventilation, the 
decision of whether or not to intubate a neonate depends on 
the docto~'s clinical judgment, and I believe that Dr. 
Morris (Dr. Rahmajani) appropriately exercised his judgment 
here. As stated, intubation would only be appropriate in 
the case of severe asphyxia, and not in the case of moderate 
asphyxia. The risks of mechanical ventilatory assistance 
include septicemia or sepsis, an increase in the incidence 
of ruptured alveoli and subsequent pulmothorax, as well as, 
additional respiratory distress--especially when you are 
dealing with such a small infant. 
Once the baby had started breathing more efficiently, he 
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discontinued oxygenation, and had the baby placed in an 
isolette. Once the baby was placed in the nursery, he again 
used his clinical judgment to determine the proper 
concentration of inspired oxygen to be provided. The 
concentration of oxygen that he decided to administer was 
30%. This was the concentration that all of the 
pediatricians at Winston Hospital were administering at this 
time. 
Dr. Morris (Dr. Rahmajani) was also careful not to 
ventilate the neonate at a concentration in excess of 40%. 
Recent studies have indicated that the provision of 
additional fractional inspired oxygen in excess of 40% can 
cause retrolental fibroplasia (RLF). RLF is a disease of 
the eyes related to hypoxemia. Vasoconstrictions as a 
result of very high concentrations of oxygen in retinal 
capillaries causes a wild overgrowth of these developing 
blood vessels; veins become numerous and dilate. In sum, 
the aqueous humor, followed by the vitreous humor, becomes 
turbid as new vessels proliferate toward the lens. The 
retina becomes edematous, and hemorrhages separate the 
retina from its attachment. Advanced scarring occurs from 
the retina to the lens, destroying the normal architecture 
of the eye. This extensive retinal detachment and scarring 
result in irreversible blindness. 
This disorder was first recognized by doctors in 1941. 
As a relationship between the administration of very high 
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concentrations of oxygen to preterm infants and RLF became 
apparent, the incidence of RLF dropped off dramatically. 
Unfortunately, however, the alternative practice of 
administering lower concentrations 
prevent RLF, began to be associated 
of oxygen, in order to 
with an increase in 
mortality rates among preterm infants --especially those 
with respiratory distress syndrome. In response, doctors, 
again, began giving higher concentrations of oxygen. 
However, as doctors were raising oxygen levels in an effort 
to prevent neonatal mortality, the number of neonates born 
with RLF began to increase. We are still conducting 
numerous studies 
American Academy 
administration of 
concentrations of 
in this area. Recently, however, The 
of Pediatrics has suggested that the 
additional fractional inspired oxygen at 
40% is considered to be safe. In this 
case, despite the other tragic consequence, it is apparent 
that Dr. Morris (Dr. Rahmajani) prevented RLF from 
developing since Lisa has normal vision. 
There is no question that it is a difficult choice for a 
pediatrician to determine what concentration of oxygen 
should be supplied. Although I agree that aterial blood 
gases are a more accurate and reliable indicator of the 
partial pressures of oxygen and carbon dioxide in the blood, 
because samples are drawn from radial, pedal, or temporal 
ateries by needle puncture, such tests also can lead to 
neonatal sepsis. In this instance, the person who is best 
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suited to tell us what concentration was required is Dr. 
Morris (Dr. Rahmajani). He is an exceptionally well 
qualified pediatrician. We must allow doctors to exercise 
their clinical judgment since their examination of the baby 
is the best indicator of how much oxygen is required. 
With regard to Dr. Michaelson's claim that the baby 
should have been transfered, I believe that proper care was 
rendered at Winston Community Hospital. This would obviate 
the need for transfer to a special center in Chicago. 
Furthermore, in this case, a quick delivery was indicated, 
and with any transfer, a potential is raised for additional 
complications. 
It is in my opinion that Dr. Morris (Dr. Rahmajani) 
exercised good judgment in caring for Lisa. I believe he 
did what should have been done, and that the tragic 
condition that this little girl ultimately ended up with was 
not caused by Dr. Morris (Dr. Rahmajani). 
III. Text of the Judge's Instuctions to the Jury 
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY 
Faithful performance by you of your duties is vital to 
the administration of justice. 
The law applicable to this case is contained 
instructions and it is your duty to follow them. 
consider these instructions as a whole, not picking 
instruction and disregarding others. 
in these 
You must 
out one 
It is your duty to determine the facts, and to 
determine them from the evidence produced in open court. 
You are to apply the law to the facts and in this way 
decide the case. Neither sympathy nor prejudice should 
influence you. Your verdict must be based on evidence and 
not upon speculation, guess or conjecture. 
The evidence which you are to consider consists of 
testimony of the witnesses and the exhibits offered and 
received. The production of evidence in court is governed 
by rules of law. From time to time it has been my duty as 
judge to rule on the admissibility of evidence. You must 
not concern yourselves with the reasons for these rulings. 
Arguments, statements and remarks of counsel are 
intended to help you in understanding the evidence and 
applying the law, but are not evidence. If any argument, 
statement or remark has no basis in the evidence, then you 
should disregard that argument, statement or remark. 
Whenever evidence was received for a limited purpose or 
limited to one party you should not consider it for any 
other purpose or as to any other party. 
Neither by these instructions nor 
remark which I have made do I or have I 
any opinion as to the facts. 
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by any ruling or 
meant to indicate 
108 
In determining whether any proposition has been proved, 
you should consider all of the evidence bearing on the 
question without regard to which party produced it. 
In considering the evidence in this case, you are not 
required to set aside your own observation and experience in 
the affairs of life, but you have a right to consider all 
the evidence in light of your own observation and experience 
in the affairs of life. 
You are the sole judges of the credibility of the 
witnesses, and of the weight to be given to the testimony of 
each of them. In determining the credit to be given any 
witness, you may take into account his ability and 
opportunity to observe, his memory, his manner while 
testifying, any interest, bias or prejudice he may have, and 
the reasonableness of his testimony considered in the light 
of all the evidence in the case. 
In deciding whether any fact has been proved, it is 
proper to consider the number of witnesses testifying on 
one side or the other as to that fact, but the number of 
witnesses alone is not conclusive, if the testimony of the 
lesser number is more convincing. 
When I use the words "ordinary care", I mean the care a 
reasonably careful person would use under circumstances 
similar to those shown by the evidence. The law does not 
say how a reasonably careful person would act under those 
circumstances. That is for you to decide. 
It was the duty of the defendant, before and at the 
time of the occurrence, to use ordinary care for the safety 
of the plaintiff. 
When I use the expression "proximate cause", I mean a 
cause which, in natural or probable sequence, produced the 
injury complained of. 
The plaintiff claims she was injured and sustained 
damage while exercising ordinary care and that the defendant 
was negligent in one or more of the following respects: 
(a) failing to intubate Lisa in a timely 
manner to provide oxygen; 
(b) failing to supply proper levels of 
oxygen once Lisa was transferred to the 
nursery; 
(c) failing to perform blood gas studies to 
determine the amount of oxygen in her 
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blood; and 
(d) failing to transfer Lisa to a neonatal care 
center. 
The plaintiff further claims that one or more of the 
foregoing was a proximate cause of her injuries. 
The defendant denies that he was negligent in doing any 
of the things claimed by the plaintiff and denies that any 
claimed act or omission on the part of the defendant was a 
proximate cause of the claimed injuries. 
When I say that a party has the burden of proof on any 
proposition, or use the expression "if you find", or "if 
you decide", I mean you must be persuaded, considering all 
the evidence in the case, that the proposition on which he 
has the burden of proof is more probably true than not true. 
The plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the 
following propositions: 
First, that the defendant acted, or failed to act in 
one of the ways claimed by the plaintiff as stated to you 
in these instructions and that in so acting, or failing to 
act, the defendant was negligent; 
Second, that the plaintiff was injured; 
Third, that the negligence of the defendant was a 
proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence 
that each of these propositions has been proved, then your 
verdict should be for the plaintiff, but, if on the other 
hand, you find from your consideration of all the evidence 
that any of these propositions has not been proved, then 
your verdict should be for the defendant. 
In treating a patient, a doctor must possess and apply 
the knowledge and use the skill and care that is ordinarily 
used by reasonably qualified doctors in the locality in 
which he practices or in similar localities in similar cases 
and circumstances. A failure to do so is a form of 
negligence that is called malpractice. 
The only way in which you may decide 
defendant possessed and applied the knowledge 
skill and care which the law required of 
evidence presented in this trial by doctors 
witnesses. You must not attempt to determine 
from any personal knowledge you have. 
whether the 
and used the 
him is from 
called expert 
this question 
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If, in the treatment of a patient, a doctor realizes, 
or, if, in the exercise of that care and skill which a 
reasonably well qualified doctor would ordinarily use in the 
locality in which he practices, or in similar localities, 
should realize that the nature of the patient's condition 
requires the services of a physician skilled in a special 
branch of medical science, then the doctor is under a duty 
to refer the patient to a specialist. 
Forms of verdict are supplied with these instructions. 
After you have reached your verdict, fill in and sign the 
appropriate form of verdict and return it into court. The 
verdict should be signed by each of you. You should not 
write or mark upon this or any of the other instructions 
given you by the court. 
If you find for the 
defendant, then you should use 
says: 
plaintiff 
the form 
and against the 
of verdict which 
"We the Jury, find for the plaintiff and against the 
defendant." 
if you 
plaintiff, 
says: 
find 
then 
for the 
you should 
defendant and against the 
use the form of verdict which 
"We the Jury, find for the defendant and against the 
plaintiff." 
APPENDIX B 
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Case Booklet # 
Questionnaire # 1 
1 1 3 
The following questions are those an attorney asks of 
potential jurors during the pretrial or voir dire phase of 
the trial. Attorneys ask these questions to determine who 
is best suited to serve as a juror. Voir dire means to 
speak the truth. 
1. What is your age? 
age 
2. What is your sex? 
sex 
3. What city/town and state are you from? 
City and State 
4. Of what nationality are you? 
5. What is your father's and/or mother's occupation. And, 
if married, what is your spouse's occupation? 
Father=~-----------------------------------
Spouse=~-----------------------------------
6. If you are currently employed, where do you work and 
what do you do? If you are not presently employed, where 
have you worked in the past, and what did you do (e.g., 
summer jobs)? 
7. Are you married? (Check one response) 
_____ YES NO 
8. Have you ever given birth? _____ NO _____ YES 
9. Were there any complications? _____ YES _____ NO 
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10. Would you say you agree or disagree with the following 
statement: 
There are too many medical malpractice cases. 
___ AGREE 
___ DISAGREE 
11. Do you have any siblings and/or relatives who were born 
mentally retarded or severly handicapped? 
___ NO ___ YES 
12. Regarding your siblings and/or relatives, was a medical 
malpractice case ever filed? 
___ YES ___ NO 
13. Are any of your family members or friends a doctor? 
___ NO ___ YES 
14. Have you ever worked in a hospital? 
___ YES ___ NO 
15. Would you say that you agree or disagree with the 
following statement: 
Doctors are not to be trusted. 
___ AGREE 
___ DISAGREE 
16. Have you, any family members or friends ever been 
involved in a medical malpractice lawsuit? 
___ YES ___ NO 
17. Did you, your family members or friends sue the doctor 
and/or hospital involved? 
___ NO 
___ YES 
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18. Did you, your family members or friends win the case? 
___ YES ___ NO 
19. Would you say that you agree or disagree with the 
following statements: 
a. Medical malpractice cases are just a way 
for attorneys and clients to make money. 
___ AGREE ___ DISAGREE 
b. Medical malpractice cases are justified 
primarily because doctors and hospitals don't 
know what they are doing half the time. 
___ DISAGREE ___ AGREE 
c. Some medical malpractice cases are justifiable 
while others are not; it just depends on the 
particular case. 
___ AGREE ___ DISAGREE 
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Case Booklet # 
Questionnaire # 2 
Please check the appropriate response. 
Do you: 
find in favor of the plaintiff, 
Mrs. Williams, and against the 
defendant, Dr. Morris (Rahmajani) 
or 
do you find in favor of the 
defendant, Dr. Morris (Rahmajani), 
and against the plaintiff, Mrs. 
Williams. 
11 7 
Please check the appropriate response. 
Do you: 
find in favor of the defendant, 
Dr. Morris (Rahmajani), and 
against the plaintiff, Mrs. Williams 
or 
do you find in favor of the 
plaintiff, Mrs. Williams, and 
against the defendant, 
Dr. Morris (Rahmajani) 
118 
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Please indicate on the following 9 point scale, the degree 
to which you feel the defendant, Dr. Morris (Rahmajani) was 
or was not negligent. (Circle the number that best 
represents how you feel.) 
not 
negligent 
at all 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
definitely 
negligent 
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Please list the factors that you feel influenced your 
decision. 
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Case Booklet # 
Questionnaire # 3 
122 
Please answer the following questions as best as you can. 
1. What are the specific charges against the defendant; in 
what way was he said to have been negligent? 
2. How is negligence determined? 
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3. What is the defendant's name? 
4. How long after he was called did the defendant arrive at 
the hospital? 
5. What are at least two different ways of administering 
oxygen mentioned in the case? 
(a)~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~­
(b)~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
6. When was Mrs. Williams expected date of delivery? 
7. What level of oxygen was administered to the infant? 
8. What problems does Lisa have because of her injury? 
9. What did Lisa's Apgar score indicate that she was 
experiencing? 
10. What is Carol Ann Williams' obstetrician's name? 
11. What can the administration of too much oxygen lead to? 
12. What were all the pediatricians at Winston Community 
Hospital also doing? 
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13. How was Lisa delivered? 
14. How much did Lisa weigh at birth? 
15. Through what method was Lisa administered oxygen? 
16. How did Mrs. Williams get to Winston Community Hospital? 
17. What were the scientific studies that the defendant's 
expert witness talked about meant to demonstrate? 
18. What was Lisa's Apgar score? 
19. What are at least two methods for determining whether an 
infant is receiving proper levels of oxygen? 
(a)~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--.,.. 
(b)~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-
20. What must a physician do in order to determine that a 
specific factor caused a specific injury to occur? 
21. How long of a time period was there between the delivery 
of the baby and the first adminstration of oxygen. 
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Case Booklet # 
Questionnaire # 4 
126 
Was Dr. Morris' (Rahmajani's) conduct in conformity with the 
standard of care exercised by reasonably well qualified 
physicians practicing in the same locality? (Check one 
response.) 
___ NO ___ YES 
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a. Is a lack of oxygen a proximate cause of the newborn 
baby's injuries? (Check one response.) 
___ YES ___ NO 
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b. Is not intubating the baby in a timely manner to provide 
oxygen a proximate cause of the newborn baby's injuries? 
(Check one response.) 
~~-NO ~~-YES 
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c. Is non-performance of blood gas studies to determine the 
amount of oxygen in the baby's blood a proximate cause of 
the newborn baby's injuries? (Check one response.) 
~~-YES ~~-NO 
130 
d. Is not transfering the baby to a neonatal care center a 
proximate cause of the baby's injuries? (Check one 
response.) 
___ NO 
___ YES 
131 
Overall, how difficult was the case to understand. (Circle 
the number that best represents how you feel.) 
1 
not 
difficult 
at all 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
very 
difficult 
132 
Please rate how important it was to you to do the best you 
could. (Circle the number that best represents how you 
feel . ) 
1 
not 
important 
at all 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
very 
important 
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Case Booklet # 
-----
Questionnaire # 5 
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Using the following 9 point scale, how likable do you feel 
the defendant's attorney was? (Circle the number that best 
represents how you feel.) 
1 
not 
likable 
at al 1 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
How difficult do you feel it was to 
defendant's attorney? 
1 
not 
difficult 
at al 1 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
8 9 
very 
likable 
understand the 
8 9 
very 
difficult 
How credible do you feel the defendant's attorney was? 
1 
not 
credible 
at al 1 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
very 
credible 
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Using the following 9 pt. scale, how likable do you feel the 
plaintiff's expert witness was? (Circle the number that 
best represents how you feel.) 
1 
not 
likable 
at all 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
very 
likable 
How difficult do you feel it was to understand the 
plaintiff's expert witness? 
not 
difficult 
at all 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
very 
difficult 
How credible do you feel the plaintiff's expert witness was? 
not 
credible 
at all 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
very 
credible 
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Using the following 9 point scale, how likeable do you feel 
the plaintiff's attorney was? (Circle the number that best 
represents how you feel.) 
not 
likable 
at al 1 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
How difficult do you feel it was to 
plaintiff's attorney? 
not 
difficult 
at all 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
8 9 
very 
likable 
understand the 
8 9 
very 
difficult 
How credible do you feel the plaintiff's attorney was? 
1 
not 
credible 
at all 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
very 
credible 
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Using the following 9 point scale, how likable do you feel 
the defendant's expert witness was? (Circle the number that 
best represents how you feel.) 
1 
not 
likable 
at all 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
very 
likable 
How difficult do you feel it was to understand the 
defendant's expert witness? 
1 
not 
difficult 
at all 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
very 
difficult 
How credible do you feel the defendant's expert witness was? 
1 
not 
credible 
at all 
2 3 1 4 5 6 7 8 9 
very 
credible 
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Using the following 9 point scale, how likable do you feel 
the defendant was? (Circle the number that best represents 
how you feel.) 
1 
not 
likable 
at al 1 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
How credible do you feel the defendant was? 
1 
not 
credible 
at al 1 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
8 
8 
9 
very 
likable 
9 
very 
credible 
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Using the following 9 point scale, how likeable do you feel 
the plaintiff was? (Circle the number that best represents 
how you feel.) 
1 
not 
likable 
at al 1 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
How credible do you feel the plaintiff was? 
1 
not 
credible 
at al 1 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
8 
8 
9 
very 
likable 
9 
very 
credible 
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